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Strategy selection is an essential aspect of problem-solving, particularly within the 
domain of mathematics. This dissertation examines the mechanisms that guide children’s 
arithmetic strategy selection in order to advance theoretical understanding of this essential 
component of cognitive development. Better understanding of arithmetic strategy selection is 
important because individual differences in children’s arithmetic strategies are predictive of 
arithmetic accuracy and later math achievement. The current study builds upon prior research 
that has identified cognitive processes associated with strategy selection by considering the role 
of metacognitive judgments. 
The study investigated the direct and indirect effects of cognitive and metacognitive 
factors on strategy selection in a group of first and second grade students (n = 126). The majority 
of students generated metacognitive judgments of their competence using decomposition (an 
advanced strategy at this age) that were consistent with their actual ability. In these cases, their 
judgments of competence were related to the frequency with which they used decomposition 
strategies. Additionally, children’s metacognitive judgments of the anticipated amount effort 
required to execute decomposition mediated the association between children’s cognitive 
 
 
processes/pre-requisite knowledge (working memory and fact fluency) and the frequency with 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Strategy selection is ubiquitous in people’s daily experience and an important aspect of 
problem-solving throughout life. In infancy, strategy selection is apparent on motor problem-
solving tasks, such as deciding how to move down a steep slope or choosing which hand to use 
to grasp an object (e.g., Adolph, 1995; McCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 1999). As children enter 
elementary school, strategy selection becomes critical for improving performance on cognitive 
problem-solving tasks, such as determining how to remember a list of objects (e.g., Coyle & 
Bjorklund, 1997) or how to spell familiar and unfamiliar words (Rittle-Johnson & Siegler, 1999). 
Indeed, increasingly adaptive strategy selection leading to improved performance is a key facet 
of cognitive development. The central goal of this dissertation is to better understand the 
mechanisms that influence children’s strategy selection and, thus, to advance theoretical 
understanding of this aspect of cognitive development.  
This goal is pursued in the context of young children’s selection of strategies for solving 
arithmetic problems for both applied and theoretical reasons. From an applied perspective, better 
understanding arithmetic strategy selection has significant practical importance. Individual 
differences in children’s arithmetic strategies are related to the accuracy of their problem-solving 
and subsequent mathematics achievement (Geary, 2011; Laski, Schiffman, Vasilyeva, & 
Ermakova, 2016). From a theoretical perspective, there is substantial empirical work about 
children’s arithmetic strategy selection, providing a foundation for the ideas explored in this 
dissertation.  
 The most notable theoretical model of strategy choice is the Overlapping Waves model. 
The Overlapping Waves model has been applied in numerous domains to explain problem-
solving behavior, including spelling, searching for hidden objects, telling-time, number-line 
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estimation, recalling lists of objects, and arithmetic (e.g., Opfer & Siegler, 2007; Pressley, 
Borkwski, & Schneider, 1989; Rittle-Johnson & Siegler, 1999; Siegler, 1996; Siegler & Shrager, 
1984). This theory emphasizes that children typically have multiple strategies available, and 
select among them in ways that maximize accuracy and efficiency.  
In the context of arithmetic problem-solving, a central thesis of the Overlapping Waves 
Model is that strategy selection is driven largely by the association of particular strategies, 
problem-types, and problem-solving outcomes; strategies that are associated with successful 
outcomes on particular problems are more likely to be selected for solving those problems than 
strategies that are not (Siegler, 1996). This model led subsequent empirical work to focus 
primarily on identifying the cognitive processes associated with strategy selection, such as 
working memory (Foley et al., 2016; Geary, 2011; Geary et al., 2004). The predominant 
emphasis on associative processes in the Overlapping Waves model, however, led most research 
to ignore the potential influence of children’s perception of strategies – that is, their 
metacognitive judgments – on their strategy selection 
 This dissertation aims to address this gap in the research and advance knowledge about 
the cognitive processes involved in strategy selection by considering the role of metacognitive 
judgments. More specifically, I posit that children are able to make explicit metacognitive 
judgments of their competence executing particular strategies and the amount of effort required 
to do so. Further, I posit that these judgments are related to children’s actual success solving 
problems with particular strategies and thus may work in concert with implicit associative 
knowledge for strategy selection. In sum, this dissertation will add to the body of work 
elucidating children’s strategy selection and advance understanding of this central aspect of 
cognitive development and problem-solving.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Strategy selection is a central aspect of problem-solving. Thus, identifying the 
mechanisms that influence children’s strategy selection is key to understanding children’s 
problem-solving behavior and potential levers for improving it. This goal is particularly 
important in the domain of mathematics, and more specifically in arithmetic problem-solving, 
where early differences in the strategies children use are related to concurrent and subsequent 
differences in achievement (Cowan et al., 2011; Geary, Hoard, Nugent, & Bailey, 2013; Jordan, 
Kaplan, Olah, & Locuniak, 2006; Jordan, Kaplan, Ramineni, & Locuniak, 2009; Lefevre et al., 
2010). Although a large amount of research has investigated the role of working memory and 
domain-knowledge in strategy selection from an associative perspective, much less work has 
investigated the potential role of metacognitive judgments of competence and effort in strategy 
selection from a motivational perspective. The present dissertation simultaneously examines the 
contributions of these various factors to children’s selection of arithmetic strategies in order to 
advance knowledge of strategy selection more generally.  
In the literature review that follows, I discuss the importance of strategy selection in 
arithmetic, survey extant research about the cognitive processes involved in arithmetic strategy 
selection, and conclude by discussing how this dissertation examines the relations between the 
various processes that have previously been investigated in isolation in order to arrive at a 
unified model of arithmetic strategy selection.  
The Importance of Strategy Selection in Arithmetic 
Arithmetic is a foundational aspect of mathematics. In particular, the ability to solve 
addition problems accurately is a building block for all other more complex operations. Children 
must be able to select and execute appropriate strategies to accurately solve problems.  In fact, 
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although children’s accuracy might reflect their current mathematical understanding, the ways in 
which children solve problems is more predictive of their future math performance (Carr & 
Alexeev, 2011; Casey, Lombardi, Pollock, Fineman, & Pezaris, 2017; Geary, 2011). Thus, it is 
essential to understand the factors that influence children’s arithmetic strategy selection.  
Types of Addition Strategies. There are four main types of strategies that can be used to 
solve addition problems: count-all, count-on, retrieval, and decomposition (Geary, Bow-Thomas, 
Lie, & Siegler, 1996; Geary, Bow-Thomas, & Yao, 1992; Shrager & Siegler, 1998). These 
strategies vary on multiple dimensions – such as, how long they take, their cognitive demands, 
the numerical knowledge required, and the kinds of problems on which they are likely to lead to 
correct answers (Geary et al., 2004; Shrager & Siegler, 1998; Siegler & Shrager, 1984; Siegler, 
1996; Torbeyns, Verschaffel, & Ghesquiere, 2004).  
Generally, during early elementary school, children progress from relying predominately 
on count-all and count-on toward relying predominately on retrieval and decomposition. Count-
all is the first strategy children tend to use. It involves counting out each addend and then 
counting the total. To solve 4 + 3, for example, a child would first count to 4, then count to 3, 
then finally count from 1 to 7. Practice with count-all leads to use of a more efficient counting 
strategy—count-on. Count-on involves mentally representing one addend and counting up the 
value of the second addend. To solve 4 + 3, for example, a child would count from 5 to 7. With 
experience solving problems, children memorize sums for simple problems with single-digit 
addends, and begin to use a retrieval strategy for those problems. Memorization of simple facts, 
in turn, supports the use of decomposition strategies (Geary, Bailey, & Hoard, 2009; Geary et al., 
2004; Siegler & Shrager, 1984). Decomposition involves transforming the original problem into 
simpler problems using previously memorized addition facts, and sometimes, the base-10 
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properties of the number system. Decomposition can take many forms, including fact-based 
(e.g., using a known fact: 8 + 7 is solved by recalling 7 + 7 =14 and 7 + 1 = 8 to determine that 8 
+ 7 = 15), ten-centered (e.g., summing to the nearest decade then adding the remainder: 7 + 5 is 
solved as 7 + 3 = 10, then 10 + 2 = 12), and separate-tens (e.g., adding the ones and the tens 
separately and then recombining them for problems with an addend above 10: 12 + 15 is solved  
2 + 5 = 7 and 10 + 10 = 20, then 20 + 7 = 27).  
Strategy Selection and Mathematics Achievement.  Acquiring these multiple strategies 
and adaptively selecting among them is key to successful problem-solving. The effectiveness of 
a strategy depends on the nature of problems to which they are applied as well as on whether a 
child has the cognitive resources and pre-requisite knowledge to successfully execute it (Geary et 
al., 2004; Laski et al., 2013; Lemaire & Callies, 2009; Shen, Vasilyeva, & Laski, 2016; Siegler, 
1996). While counting strategies require relatively little numerical knowledge, they become 
increasingly error-prone and inefficient as the size of addends increases because of the difficulty 
of keeping track while counting a large number of items (Davis & Carr, 2002; Laski et al., 2013, 
2016; Woodward et al., 2012). Indeed, when solving problems with multi-digit numbers, the use 
of decomposition is consistently associated with greater arithmetic accuracy (Biddlecomb & 
Carr, 2011; Geary, Fan, & Bow-Thomas, 1992; Geary et al., 2004; Laski et al., 2016; Ramirez, 
Chang, Maloney, Levine, & Beilock, 2016; Torbeyns et al., 2004; Vasilyeva, Laski, & Shen, 
2015).   
Unfortunately, not all children select to use decomposition when it would be most 
effective. On multi-digit problems, many first- and second-graders continue to rely on counting 
strategies (e.g., Carr & Alexeev, 2011; Casey et al., 2017; Geary, 2011; Laski et al., 2016). This 
poor strategy selection negatively impacts their accuracy on those problems as well as their 
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subsequent math achievement (Carr & Alexeev, 2011; Geary, 1990, 2011; Geary & Brown, 1991; 
Goldman, Pellegrino, & Mertz, 1988; Jordan, Levine, & Huttenlocher, 1995). When solving 
arithmetic problems, second-graders who were more reliant on counting manipulatives (such as 
counters or fingers) showed less growth by fourth grade than children who were more reliant on 
cognitive strategies (such as decomposition) (Carr & Alexeev, 2011). In contrast, children who 
use decomposition more frequently than counting strategies in first grade perform better on math 
achievement tests through fifth grade (Casey et al., 2017; Geary, 2011). Thus, it is important to 
understand the factors influencing children’s arithmetic strategy selection and, in particular, what 
impacts their use of decomposition.  
Cognitive Processes Involved in Strategy Selection 
Associative Processes. According to the Overlapping Waves model, when children 
encounter an arithmetic problem, they will rely on the strategy they most strongly associate with 
that problem type. A strategy that has previously led to successful performance will be more 
strongly associated with the same problem and similar ones than a strategy that has not (Shrager 
& Siegler, 1998; Siegler, 1996; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; Siegler & Lemaire, 1997; Siegler & 
Shipley, 1995; Siegler & Shrager, 1984). Thus, the ability to accurately execute a strategy should 
be related to the frequency with which that strategy will be selected. In fact, research indicates 
that children who are able to accurately execute a strategy when required to use it are also more 
likely to select that strategy when given an option to select any strategy (Lemaire, 2010; Lemaire 
& Callies, 2009; Siegler & Lemaire, 1997; Torbeyns et al., 2004). At the same time, the 
probability that children can successfully execute a strategy may be related to their cognitive 
resources and numerical knowledge. Thus, these underlying factors might strengthen or weaken 
the association between strategy and problem type and implicitly influence strategy selection.  
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Children’s working memory capacity, in particular, has been found to be related to 
strategy selection. Working memory allows individuals to temporarily encode, manipulate, and 
retrieve a limited number of units of information (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974, 1994). In math tasks, 
it is necessary to mentally hold and manipulate information when solving problems. Thus, it 
makes sense that greater working memory capacity is related to higher overall mathematics 
achievement as early as elementary school (Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Berg, 2008; Bull & 
Scerif, 2001; Geary, 2011) as well as to better accuracy on a variety of numerical and arithmetic 
tasks (Fuchs, Geary et al., 2007; Geary, Fuchs, & Bryant, 2010; Geary, Hoard, Byrd-Craven, 
Nugent, & Numtee, 2007; Li & Geary, 2017). Further, recent research suggests that children with 
greater working memory capacity are more likely to select decomposition to solve arithmetic 
problems than those with poorer working memory (Foley et al., 2016; Geary, 2011; Ramirez et 
al., 2016). Children with greater working memory may be better able to remember the interim 
steps when executing decomposition (e.g., when solving 8 + 5 as 8 + 2 =10 then 10 +3 = 13, 
children must hold the 3 in working memory while solving 8 +2 = 10). Thus, greater working 
memory may lead to a higher probability of success when using decomposition and, thus, help 
establish a strong association between the strategy and accuracy.   
Similarly, children’s existing numerical knowledge can influence the probability of 
successfully executing various strategies (Carr & Alexeev, 2011; Geary, 2011; Geary et al., 2009; 
Halpern et al., 2007). While knowledge of the count sequence is sufficient to being able to 
successfully use a counting strategy, it is insufficient for decomposition. Executing a 
decomposition strategy inherently relies on retrieving from memory sums of simple arithmetic 
facts. Thus, children who lack fact fluency may not select to use decomposition because, in part, 
without fact fluency they would have a low probability of accurately executing it. Consistent 
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with this analysis, children with poor basic fact fluency are more likely to rely on counting 
strategies than decomposition (Bull & Johnston, 1997; Goldman et al., 1988; Jordan, Hanich, & 
Kaplan, 2003).  
Models that include only associative processes based on probability of success, however, 
have been unable to fully explain arithmetic strategy selection. For example, some children use 
advanced strategies more frequently than basic strategies even when the likelihood of them 
generating a correct response is low (Siegler, 1988). Thus, some other processes must be 
involved in directing the selection of strategies. One possible source, that is less well understood, 
is metacognitive judgments. 
Metacognitive Processes.  Metacognitive processes refers to ways in which individuals’ 
knowledge of or subjective feelings about their own cognition influences their behavior (Flavell, 
1979; Koriat, 2000, 2007). Metacognitive knowledge involves explicit, verbalizable awareness 
about elements of a problem-solving situation, such as the advantages and disadvantages of 
various strategies for accomplishing a goal. Some models of metacognition propose that this 
knowledge influences strategy selection via conscious deliberation (Case, 1978; Kuhn, 1988); 
whereas, other models propose that it can exert an influence on strategy selection without 
rational deliberation (Greeno, Riley, & Gelman, 1984; Halford, 1993). 
An important consideration in linking metacognitive knowledge to strategy selection is 
identifying what kind of knowledge has an influence. Initial applications of metacognition to 
strategy selection emphasized the importance of knowledge about the effectiveness of particular 
strategies (Kuhn, 1988; Schneider & Pressley, 1989). Consistent with this view, some research 
demonstrated that children are able to explicitly consider the accuracy of particular strategies and 
that this, in turn, influences their choice of strategies. For instance, Ghatala and colleagues 
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(1986) found that second-graders who were taught to explicitly compare the accuracy of different 
strategies, were more likely to later select strategies that led to greater accuracy. Carr and Jessup 
(1995) found that mid-year second graders who were better able to articulate the usefulness of 
strategies for correctly solving different problem types (e.g., decomposition is useful for 
problems with larger numbers), were more likely to select that strategy on appropriate problems 
and have higher arithmetic accuracy at the end of second grade. On the other hand, research 
found that even when children know one strategy is superior to another, their strategy selection is 
not always consistent with this knowledge (Wellman, 1983) and found only moderate relations 
between metacognitive knowledge about strategy effectiveness and selection (Schneider & 
Pressley, 1989). It is possible that the effectiveness of particular strategies is captured via 
associative processes, hence metacognitive awareness of it has only a modest contribution to 
strategy selection (Siegler & Shipley, 1995). Thus, it may be more productive to consider the 
influence of other types of metacognitive knowledge.  
Theoretical and empirical work from the field of motivation—in particular, Expectancy-
Value theory—offers a new perspective for considering the kinds of metacognitive knowledge 
that may influence strategy selection. According to Expectancy-Value theory, individuals’ 
judgments of their own competence and of the cost (e.g., amount of effort needed) of particular 
approaches influences behavior (Barron & Hulleman, 2015; Eccles et al., 1983; Eccles & 
Wigfield, 2002). Consistent with the view that judgments of competence direct behavior, 
research indicates that children are able to make unique competence judgments for various 
domains and tasks and that these judgments influence decisions about participation in domain-
specific activities (Eccles, Wigfield, Harold, & Blumenfeld, 1993; Lauermann, Chow, & Eccles, 
2015; Watt et al., 2012; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992, 2000) and strategy selection (Ghatala, Levin, 
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Pressley, & Goodwin, 1986). Further, children who make more accurate judgments of 
competence, relative to their actual ability, are more accurate in subsequent problem solving, 
perhaps because they more adaptively select strategies (Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014). In terms of 
effort judgments, there is also some empirical research in support of the idea that the effort 
related with particular approaches influences behavior. In a wide range of domains, individuals 
select strategies that require less effort more often than those that require more effort (cf., 
Bjorklund, Muir-Broaddus, & Schneider, 1990).  
Currently, there is a very limited amount of work examining the influence of 
metacognitive knowledge in arithmetic selection, and none explicitly examining the role of 
competence and effort judgments. This limited evidence, however, does suggest some influence 
of metacognitive judgments. For example, Carr and colleagues (1994, 1995) found that children 
were able to make judgments about the utility of particular strategies and that strategies that were 
judged as more useful were more likely to be selected during problem solving. Siegler and 
Shrager (1998) found that a computational model that included metacognitive judgments of how 
confident a problem solver was in retrieving an answer produced patterns of strategy selection 
consistent with behavioral data. Thus, work examining the influence of metacognitive judgments 
of competence and effort on strategy selection may enhance current understanding of arithmetic 
strategy selection.  
Another issue that remains unexplored in the study of arithmetic strategy selection is 
what factors give rise to children’s metacognitive knowledge. It would seem likely, for example, 
that competence judgments, in particular, should be informed by past experiences and a history 
of success (Barron & Hulleman, 2015; Eccles et al., 1993; Eccles, Wigfield, & Schiefele, 1998). 
Yet, competence judgments are not always calibrated with actual competence levels (Frenzel, 
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Goetz, Pekrun, & Watt, 2010; Watt, 2004; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991). The 
association between actual ability and competence judgments seems to be most pronounced 
among those with the highest level of ability; children who are more accurate on arithmetic 
problems generate metacognitive competence judgments that are more closely calibrated with 
their actual competence (Bellon, Fias, & De Smedt, 2019; Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014). Judgments 
of effort might be influenced by individual differences in cognitive resources and pre-requisite 
knowledge. For instance, quickly retrieving basic facts makes solving complex problems less 
effortful than reliance on cumbersome counting strategies (Ashcraft, Donley, Halas, & Vakali, 
1992). If actual ability, cognitive resources, and pre-requisite knowledge already accounted for in 
associative models of strategy selection give rise to metacognitive judgments, then the question 
becomes, to what extent do metacognitive judgments of competence and effort determine 
strategy choice above and beyond these factors.   
The Present Study 
The overarching purpose of the present study was to advance understanding of the 
processes that influence children’s choice of addition strategies, particularly their selection of 
decomposition. While a few studies of strategy selection considered the role of general 
metacognitive judgments (e.g., Carr & Jessup, 1995; Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984), they 
have not specifically examined judgments of competency or anticipated effort nor have they 
considered how such judgments combine with other processes to influence strategy selection. 
This dissertation was motivated by the idea that understanding how metacognitive judgments of 
competence and effort fit into a larger strategy-selection framework will provide both a more 
complete depiction of the processes underlying children’s problem-solving strategy choice and  
support instructional efforts to optimize children’s strategy selection.   
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With this larger aim in mind, this study pursued three goals. The first goal was to 
determine whether first and second graders can make metacognitive judgments of their 
competence in executing a particular strategy—decomposition—and the amount of effort it 
would require of them. Two new measures were developed for this purpose, one to elicit 
competence judgments and another to elicit effort judgments. While the Likert-scale approach 
employed in the measures was adapted from established approaches for assessing children’s 
attitudes and perceptions about math (Davies & Brember, 1994; Gunderson, Hamdan, Sorhagen, 
& D’Esterre, 2017; Ramirez, Gunderson, Levine, & Beilock, 2012), the current measures 
differed in two critical ways. Specifically, these measures required children to make 
metacognitive judgments about a specific strategy across different kinds of contexts (single- and 
mixed-digit addition problems). Further, the measures required children to make prospective 
judgments, rather than retrospective judgments, which are more likely to be the kind of 
judgments  that would inform strategy selection before problem-solving.  
A related question was whether children as young as first and second grade are able to 
make competence judgments that are consistent with their actual performance. If children are 
unable to explicitly associate their accuracy on problems with the strategy used to solve them, 
and only have this information available implicitly as suggested by the Overlapping Waves 
model, then children’s competence judgments should be poorly calibrated, both underestimating 
and overestimating their competence. Another possibility was that even if children can explicitly 
link a strategy with a likelihood of correct problem solving, first and second graders might 
consistently overestimate their competence, as is the tendency among young children in other 
domains (Shin, Bjorklund, & Beck, 2007).  
13 
 
However, given that by first grade children have received a great deal of feedback about 
the success of arithmetic strategies during problem-solving, I hypothesized that children do 
explicitly link strategies to accuracy and would be able to provide highly calibrated, accurate 
judgments of competence. This hypothesis led to two specific predictions. First, accuracy using 
decomposition and children’s judgments of their competence executing it should be positively 
related. Second, children’s judgments should be calibrated, such that there is high alignment 
between children’s accuracy in solving problems using decomposition and their judgments of 
their competence in executing decomposition on the same problems.  
The second goal of the present study was to explore the factors that might inform 
children’s metacognitive knowledge. In relation to competence judgments, I hypothesized 
amount of experience and a history of success to be the key factors, as is often posited by 
motivational researchers (Barron & Hulleman, 2015; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). If amount of 
experience is related to competence judgments, then children’s judgments should be more 
calibrated on problems with which they have more experience and have likely received more 
feedback (i.e., single-digit problems), than on problems with which they have less experience 
(i.e., mixed-digit problems). Further, children who are better able to execute decomposition, 
suggesting they have more experience and a greater history of success, should have more 
calibrated judgments. Children’s calibration level does not necessarily reflect their ability level. 
For example, children could be highly calibrated because they are poor at using decopmosition 
and they judge their competence to be low.  
 In relation to effort judgments, I hypothesized that children’s memory capacity and pre-
requisite knowledge would relate to their anticipated levels of effort. Relying on memorized 
addition facts can decrease the effort needed to execute decomposition because it eliminates the 
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need for cumbersome counting procedures (Ashcraft et al., 1992). Greater memory capacity 
should decrease effort in executing decomposition by making it easier for children to keep track 
of the interim steps and sums. Thus, children with greater working memory capacity and fact 
fluency should judge decomposition to be less effortful.  
The third and central goal of the study was to investigate the role of metacognitive 
competence and effort judgments in decomposition strategy selection. This study is the first to 
test whether children’s prospective judgments of their competence and effort in executing an 
addition strategy are related to their subsequent selection of that strategy during problem solving. 
Further, I considered how these metacognitive processes might work in concert with associative 
processes already well-established in the literature to direct strategy selection in order to 
understand how metacognitive knowledge fits in with existing models of arithmetic strategy 
choice.  
Research from the field of motivation has shown that individuals’ confidence levels 
influence their behavior and decision making (Kapricke, 2009; Wall, Thompson, Dunlosky, & 
Merriman, 2016). Thus, it seemed likely that children who perceive themselves to be more 
competent at using decomposition would choose to use it more frequently and that this 
metacognitive knowledge would mediate the already established relation between strategy ability 
and selection (Lemaire & Callies, 2009; Siegler & Lemarie, 1997; Torbeyns et al., 2004). 
Children who are better able to accurately execute decomposition strategies should view 
themselves as more competent and, thus, decide to use decomposition with greater frequency.  
Alternatively, it is possible that the likelihood of successfully executing a particular 
strategy is represented via associative learning and hence metacognitive awareness of it has only 
a modest, if any, additional contribution to strategy selection (Siegler & Shipley, 1995). Most 
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first- and second-graders have less experience with mixed-digit problems and thus should have 
had less opportunity to establish an association between decomposition and probability of 
success. If the involvement of competence judgments in strategy selection depends on whether 
the associative knowledge is sufficient to drive strategy selection, then the relation between 
competence judgments and decomposition selection should be stronger on mixed-digit than 
single-digit problems. Further, it would be unlikely that competence judgments explain 
differences in strategy selection above and beyond strategy ability.  
The idea that effort judgments would influence decomposition selection seemed most 
likely. Children sometimes use efficient advanced strategies (e.g., count-on/retrieval) more 
frequently than basic ones (e.g., count all) even when the likelihood of them generating a correct 
response is low (Siegler, 1988). This phenomenon suggests that children may take into account 
the amount of effort needed to execute strategies, even at the expense of optimizing accuracy. 
Consistent with this premise, Carr and Jessup (1995) found that children’s metacognitive 
knowledge of the likelihood a strategy would yield the correct solution (effectiveness) was 
related to the frequency with which children chose to use decomposition, but not of less effortful 
strategies (counting and retrieval), suggesting that something other than expected probability of 
success was influencing decomposition selection. Further, no associative process that captures 
effort has been proposed, perhaps making metacognitive awareness of it more active in decision 
making. Thus, I predicted that children who anticipate decomposition to be effortful would 
choose to use it less frequently and that effort judgments may be more predictive than 
competence for decomposition choice. Moreover, I predicted that effort judgments may help 
explain the well-established relations between fact fluency/memory and decomposition use. 
Because children’s fact fluency and memory are likely to influence the amount of effort needed 
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to execute decomposition, it could be that they partly influence decomposition selection via 





CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
Participants  
Participants in the present study included a total of 126 children (61 girls) recruited from 
four schools in the greater Boston area, including one private independent school, one parochial 
school, and two suburban public schools. The participants’ ages ranged from 6.2 to 8.9 years 
(mean age = 7.1 years, 106 first- and 20 second graders). A power analysis indicated that the 
sample size is adequate to detect medium effects for regression models and mediation models 
with bootstrapping (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Fritz & MacKinnon, 2010).  
The demographic characteristics of the sample were determined via a parent 
questionnaire. Six percent of parents did not report education level, 24% did not report income 
level, and 10% did not report their child’s race. The available responses indicated that most 
parents were highly educated; 70% of families included at least one parent with a graduate 
degree and only 7% of families did not include at least one parent with a bachelor’s degree. 
Consistent with their educational level, most families were affluent: with 9% of families earning 
less than $50,000 a year, 11% between $50,000 and $99,999, 39% between $100,000 and 
$250,000, and 17% earning over $250,000 a year. The sample was moderately diverse in terms 
of race and ethnicity: 54% White/Caucasian, 20% Asian/Asian American, 3% Black/African 
American, 2% American Indian or Alaskan Native, 7% biracial, and 3% “other.” Additionally, 
14% percent of children were reported as being Hispanic/Latino.   
Procedure  
The study involved two one-on-one sessions with an experimenter in a quiet location in 
the children’s schools. There was an average of 10 days (SD = 6) between the two sessions. 
During the first session, children completed a general math competency judgment task, two 
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memory tasks (first verbal and then visuospatial memory), a fact fluency task, and a “choice” 
addition strategy task, which were counterbalanced across children. During the second session, 
students completed two metacognitive tasks – competence and effort judgments related to the use 
of decomposition – counterbalanced across individuals and, at the end of the session, a “no-
choice” addition strategy task. 
Measures  
Memory Tasks. Two tasks were used to measure children’s verbal and visuospatial short-
term and working-memory: the WISC-IV Digit Recall task (Wechsler, 2003) and the Corsi Block 
task (Kessels, Van Zandvoort, Postma, Kapelle, & De Haan, 2000). The answer sheets and 
scripts for these tasks can be found in Appendix A.  
Digit Recall. The Digit Recall task is a measure of verbal short-term and working 
memory (Wechsler, 2003). The task asks the child to repeat a sequence of orally-presented 
numbers in forwards and backwards order to measure verbal short-term and working memory, 
respectively.  Sequences increased in length from two to nine digits, until the child was incorrect 
on two consecutive trials. Children’s scores were calculated as the total number of sequences 
correctly repeated, with separate scores for the forward and backward tasks. Test-retest reliability 
for children between 6 and 16 years old is high (r = 0.83; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003). 
Corsi Blocks. The Corsi Block task is a measure of visuospatial short-term and working 
memory. The task asks the child to tap a visually-presented series of blocks, arranged in a 
scattered array, in a forwards and backwards order to measure visuospatial short-term and 
working memory, respectively. Series lengths increased from two to nine blocks, until the child 
was incorrect on two consecutive trials. Children’s scores were calculated as the total number of 
series correctly tapped, with separate scores for the forward and backward tasks. Test-retest 
19 
 
reliability for older children is moderately high (r = 0.70–0.79; Orsini, 1994), and the task has 
been used successfully with younger children in previous research (Bull, Espy, & Wiebe, 2008).  
Fact Fluency. The fact fluency task assessed children’s ability to fluently retrieve the 
sums to simple problems. The measure included all two-addend addition facts, with addends 
between 2 and 9, whose sums are equal to or below 10 as well as any problems with doubles 
(e.g., 8 + 8). Problems including 1 as an addend were excluded given their simplicity for this age 
group and that they can be solved using counting almost as quickly as using fact retrieval. In 
total, the measure included 32 problems, including 10 sets of associative pairs (e.g., 2 + 6 and 6 
+ 2), listed in Appendix B.   
The task followed a procedure equivalent to that used in prior research with similarly- 
aged children  (Lefevre et al., 2013). Problems were randomized across individuals and 
presented one at a time on a computer using Eprime. Children were instructed to say the answer 
to each problem as quickly as possible. As soon as they said their answer, the experimenter, 
pressed the space bar to mark latency, and then typed the child’s answer, for later accuracy 
coding. Children were credited for each problem that they answered accurately within three 
seconds. Due to experimenter or technological errors, data from this task is missing for three 
children.  
Metacognitive Tasks. The metacognitive tasks measured children’s verbalizable 
metacognitive knowledge about (1) their competence in accurately executing decomposition; (2) 
the effort required of them to execute decomposition; and (3) their general math competence. 
Metacognitive judgments of decomposition competence and effort were administered during the 
second testing session, and were blocked by type and counterbalanced across individuals. The 
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metacognitive task of general math competence was administered separately from the other two 
metacognitive tasks during the first testing session.  
Before the two blocks related to decomposition competence and effort, the experimenter 
stated that she/he wanted to know how the child felt about solving problems using a “breaking it 
up” strategy (used to refer to decomposition) and provided an explanation and example of the 
strategy. The instructions were designed to ensure that children understood what the strategy 
was, but would not teach children how to use the strategy.  Both the competence and effort tasks 
included the same six unique addition problems in a set random order; half were single digit 
problems and half were mixed-digit problems. The problems used are provided in Table 1. For 
each item, the experimenter presented the written arithmetic problem and then read the judgment 
prompt. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced across individuals.  
Decomposition Competence Judgments. The competence judgment task measured 
children’s metacognitive knowledge of their own competence in using decomposition to solve 
single- and mixed-digit problems. The procedure was adapted from the Child Math Anxiety 
Questionnaire (Ramirez, Gunderson, Levine, & Beilock, 2013). For each addition problem, the 
experimenter said: “Imagine that you could only solve [problem] by breaking it up into smaller 
problems. How good do you think you would be at solving it by breaking it up?” Children 
indicated their response using a six-point Likert scale where each point was designated with a 
different smiley face ranging from a face with a large frown on the left to a face with a large 
smile on the right. To ensure that children understood the task, the experimenter explained what 
the items on the smiley face scale signified and then the child completed two practice trials 
before proceeding to test trials. The task script and Likert-scale used can be found in Appendix 
C. The internal consistency of the scale was good (α = .83) and equivalent to or better than that 
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of other Likert-scales used to assess first and second-grade students academic attitudes (Davies 
& Brember, 1994; Gunderson et al., 2017; Ramirez et al., 2012). 
Decomposition Effort Judgments. The effort judgment task measured children’s 
metacognitive knowledge of the effort needed for them to execute the decomposition strategy. 
For each addition problem, the experimenter said: “Imagine that you could only solve [read 
problem] by breaking it up into smaller problems. Do you think you would have to work hard or 
not work hard to solve the problem by breaking it up?” To reduce social desirability bias and 
increase variability in responses, a two-part scale with arrays of circles of varying sizes was used 
for children to indicate their response (Gunderson et al., 2017; Harter, 1981, 1982). In the first 
part of the scale, children indicated if they would have to work hard or not by pointing to either a 
large blue circle or a small green circle. In the second part of the scale, children indicated the 
extent of effort. If the child responded that they would have to work hard, they were presented 
with an array of three blue circles of decreasing size, and asked if they would have to work “very 
hard” (largest circle), “pretty hard” (medium circle), or “kind of hard” (smallest circle). If the 
child responded they would not have to work hard, they were presented with an array of three 
green circles of decreasing size and asked if they would have to work “a little hard” (largest 
circle), “tiny bit hard” (medium circle), or “not hard at all” (smallest circle). All three of the blue 
“work hard” circles were larger than the three green “not work hard” circles. Responses were 
scored on a scale from 1 (really hard) to 6 (not hard at all). Internal consistency of the scale was 
good (α = .83). The script and illustrations of the arrays used in this task can be found in 
Appendix C.   
Math Competence Judgments. The math competence judgment task measured children’s 
perceptions of their math ability in order to examine whether overall math competence and 
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competence with decomposition, in particular, were differentiated. It was based on a task 
developed by Gunderson and colleagues (2017) for first- and second-grade students. The task 
included 3 items: how good are you at math; how good are you at learning something new in 
math; and how well do you think you will do in math class this year. Children responded to each 
item using the same 6-point smiley face array used in the decomposition competency judgment  
task. The internal consistency of this scale was poor (α = .22), perhaps due to the small number 
of items. 
Addition Strategy Tasks. In accordance with previous strategy selection studies (e.g., 
Carr & Davis, 2001; Lemaire & Callies, 2009; Lemaire & Lecacheur, 2002; Siegler & Lemaire, 
1997; Torbeyns et al., 2004), two addition tasks were used to assess children’s strategy use: (1) a 
choice task to assess whether children adaptively selected to use decomposition and (2) a no-
choice task to assess children’s ability to accurately execute decomposition when required to do 
so.  Problems in both tasks (18 in the choice task, 12 in the no-choice task) were presented in one 
quasi-random order, with single-digit and mixed-digit problems interspersed. As shown in the list 
of problems found in Table 1, no addends over 40 were used in the mixed-digit problems due to 
concerns that students would assume problems with very large addends were difficult. The 
experimenter presented one problem at time, read it aloud, gave the children as much time as 
needed to solve it. Children were not provided with any supplies, such as paper or pencil, and 
were instructed to verbally provide the solution. Responses in both tasks were coded for 







List of Problems Administered During the Arithmetic Strategy Tasks, Separated by Problem Type 
and Task 
 
Arithmetic Task Single-Digit Mixed-Digit 
Choice Task   
 9 + 5 27 + 4 
 8 + 9 7 + 35 
 7 + 8 36 + 5 
 8 + 6 29 + 3 
 7 + 6 6 + 39 
 3 + 9 8 + 13 
 4 + 7 25 + 7 
 9 + 6 4 + 19 
 3 + 8 19 + 7 
No-Choice Task   
 4 + 8* 25 + 7* 
 6 + 8* 39 + 4* 
 8 + 5 3 + 19 
 9 + 7* 7 + 38 
 6 + 9 26 + 7 
 7 + 4 5 + 16* 
Note: Problems with a * were also included in the metacognitive tasks.  
 
Choice Task. In the choice task, children were simply told to solve the problems, which 
included nine single-digit and nine mixed-digit addition problems. As the child engaged in 
problem solving, the experimenter recorded any overt signs of strategy use, such as counting 
aloud or using fingers. In cases where the experimenter was not able to determine the strategy 
based solely on overt actions, she/he asked the child to explain how she/he “figured it out” after 
the child had provided the solution. This combination of behavioral observations and 
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retrospective self-reports has been found to lead to valid strategy classifications (Rittle-Johnson 
& Siegler, 1999; Siegler, 1987).  
Children’s strategies were classified based on coding schemes used in previous studies 
(e.g., Geary et al., 1996, 2004; Laski, Ermakova, & Vasilyeva, 2014; Laski et al., 2016). 
Strategies were assigned one of five codes: (1) count-all for counting out each addend beginning 
with one; (2) count-on for counting-up from one of the addends; (3) retrieval for recalling the 
sum from memory within three seconds; (4) decomposition for transforming the original problem 
into two or more simpler problems; (5) or other if the strategy could not be coded into one of the 
four previous categories or if children reported guessing. Because fact retrieval is only possible 
with single-digit numbers (Geary et al., 2004), the retrieval code was only applied to single-digit 
problems. Further, to ensure consistency in coding, a set of rules was developed for describing 
the kinds of transformations that would be considered decomposition (see Table 2).  
Because I was primarily interested in children’s selection of decomposition, I further 
coded the decomposition strategies to identify the particular type of decomposition used. Three 
different types of decomposition were coded: (1) ten-centered when children summed up or 
down from 10 or a number divisible by 10 (e.g., solving 8 + 6 by first adding 8 + 2 = 10 and then 
adding 4 more); (2) separating-10s when children separated the 10s and units from a number 
greater than 10 and added the tens and units separately (e.g., solving 36 + 5 by separating 36 into 
30 + 6, adding 5 + 6 = 11, and then adding 30); and (3) fact-based when children transformed a 
problem into two or more simpler problems using math facts recalled from memory (e.g., solving 
7 + 6 by recalling that 6 + 6 = 12 and 6 + 1 = 7 and finally adding 12 + 1). A strategy was coded 
as fact-based decomposition only on single-digit problems; if a child used recalled facts to solve 
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a mixed-digit problem after separating a double-digit number into 10s and units, the strategy was 
coded as separating-10s. 
Table 2 
Rules for Coding Decomposition  
Rules Example of following the rule 
Example of violating the 
rule 
At least one addend must 
be decomposed into 2 or more 
components  
Problem: 6+8 
6=2+4. 8+2=10 +4=14 
Problem: 4+8 
“I know that 6+8=14” (no 
decomposing/transforming) 
   
The decomposition may involve 
no more than a single 1 as one of 






   
One of the components must be 
combined/subtracted with/from 
the second addend  
Problem: 25+7 
25=20+5. 5+7=12 +20=32 
Problem: 25+7 
25=20+5. 20+5=25 +7=32 
   
Must use appropriate operation 




9-1=8. 9+9=18 -1=17  
Problem: 8+9 
9=7+2. 8+7=15 -2=13 
   
Does not add an addend or part of 
an addend after already adding 
components 
Problem: 7+4 
4=3+1. 7+3=10 +1=11 
Problem: 7+4 
4=3+1. 7+3=10 +7=17 
 
 
No-Choice Task. In the no-choice task, children were directed to solve six single-digit 
and six mixed-digit addition problems using a decomposition (a.k.a. “breaking it up”) strategy. 
The experimenter reminded children what a “breaking it up” strategy is, and told them they 
needed to use it to solve the problems. To further ensure the use of decomposition on these trials, 
children were shown two examples of using a “breaking it up” strategy (one of which was also 
presented during the metacognitive task instructions), followed by a practice trial with feedback. 
The full script for this task can be found in Appendix D.   
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The twelve test trials had similarly-sized addends and sums to the problems used in the 
choice task; half included one addend less than five and half included two addends greater than 
5. To better allow for examining the relation between ability and metacognitive judgments, three 
single-digit and three mixed-digit problems were the same as those used in the metacognitive 













CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 The focus of analyses was to examine (a) children’s strategy use; (b) children’s 
metacognitive knowledge about their competence and effort in using decomposition; and (c) how 
associative and metacognitive factors interact to influence strategy selection, specifically the 
choice to use decomposition. The results relevant to these goals are presented in the sections that 
follow.  
Preliminary Analyses 
The descriptive data, presented in Table 3, indicated that children were neither at floor 
nor ceiling on any of the measures and that there was a reasonable amount of variance across 
children. Further, preliminary analyses found that the SES variables of family income and 
parental education, while often related to math competence (Duncan et al., 2007; Laski et al., 
2016; Nores & Barnett, 2014), were only correlated with a subset of the measures, with no 
correlation above r = .37 in the present study. These bivariate correlations are presented in 
Appendix E. Further, when one or both measures were entered into the analyses reported below, 
the SES variables were insignificant. Thus, in the current study, parental education and family 











Descriptive Statistics for All Measures  
 Measure Mean (SD) Maximum possible score 
Memory Capacity   
 Verbal Short-Term Memory 7.87 (1.84) 16 
 Verbal Working Memory 5.54 (1.41) 16 
 Visuospatial Short-Term Memory 6.39 (1.59) 16 
 Visuospatial Working Memory 7.31 (2.14) 16 
Prerequisite Knowledge   
 Arithmetic Fluency 17.12 (9.86) 32 
Metacognitive Judgments   
 Decomposition Competence Judgment  4.87 (.99) 6 
 Decomposition Anticipated Effort 2.70 (1.17) 6 
 Overall Math Competence Judgment  5.04 (.57) 6 
Arithmetic Strategy   
 Choice Task Decomposition Attempt 46% (35) 100% 
 No Choice Task Accuracy with 
Decomposition 60% (38) 100% 
 
Description of Strategy Use 
 Strategy Selection. Results of the choice task, where children were able to solve addition 
problems using their choice of strategy for each problem, are presented in Table 4. 
Decomposition was the most commonly used strategy; it was used on the majority of all 
problems and on the majority of each problem type. When children used decomposition, they 
most frequently used a ten-centered approach. The second most common strategy was count-on. 
On single-digit problems, where fact-retrieval was possible, it was also relatively common. 
Children rarely relied on count-all, as would be expected in first and second grade, and only a 
small number of problems were either not codable or coded as a guess (the “other” category). If 
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children refused to solve a specific problem, that problem was categorized as “skip,” which 
happened quite rarely.   
Table 4 













51 (41)  




35 (35)  




16 (23)  






























Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Percentages represent strategies that were used to solve 
problems regardless of accuracy.   
  
The pattern of strategy selection in the no-choice task was similar. While children were 
instructed to use decomposition in this task, there were able to select the kind of decomposition 
they chose to use. Again, ten-centered was the most common decomposition strategy used on 
both single- and mixed-digit problems. 
Furthermore, this pattern of strategy selection was related to overall addition accuracy as 
would be expected. First and second graders who predominately used counting strategies were 
less accurate at solving addition problems than their peers who selected to use decomposition 
more frequently. The percentage of problems on which children attempted decomposition and 
retrieval were positively correlated with overall accuracy on the choice task, r(124) =.52, p <.001 
and r(124) = .33, p < .001, respectively. On the other hand, more frequent use of count-all and 
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“other” were negatively correlated with accuracy, r(124) = -.37, p < .001 and r(124) = -.73, p < 
.001, respectively, while count-on was not correlated with accuracy, r(124) = -.15, p = .12. The 
use of decomposition was most strongly associated with addition accuracy. This finding is 
consistent with previous literature and provides justification for the present studies focus on 
examining the factors that influence decomposition selection.  
Strategy Ability. When children selected to use a strategy on the choice task, they were 
generally able to execute it accurately. For each strategy, I calculated the number of problems 
answered correctly using the strategy divided by the number of problems on which the child 
attempted the strategy. Children answered 57% (SD= 43) of the problems on which they selected 
to use count all correctly, 77% (SD = 23) of problems on which they selected count on, 75% 
(SD= 34) on which they selected retrieval, and 90% (SD = 18) on which they selected 
decomposition. Not only were children most accurate at executing decomposition when they 
attempted it, but there was also the least variability in accuracy. This measure of ability, 
however, is conflated with strategy selection. In other words, children may only select to use 
decomposition on the choice task, when they are likely to execute it correctly.  
Accuracy on the no-choice task, on the other hand, offers a more direct measure of ability 
to execute decomposition because use was not conflated with choice. While children did not 
comply with the requirement to use decomposition on all trials (35% of trials were solved using 
another strategy), it is likely they were unable to comply because of an inability to execute 
decomposition. Consequently, the percentage of trials on which children accurately used 
decomposition (the measure of their ability) was calculated out of all trials: decomposition 
accuracy = number of trials on which decomposition was used accurately/number of trials.  As 
shown in Table 5, children accurately executed decomposition it on the majority of trials (60%) 
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on the no-choice task, but their accuracy was not as high as on the choice task, when they were 
able to select themselves on which problems to use decomposition. Thus, this measure, which 
seems to be a more direct measure of ability to execute decomposition, is used in all subsequent 
analyses. 
Table 5 
Percentages of Problems on Which Each Type of Decomposition was correctly used on the No-
Choice Task  
   
All Problems  
Single-Digit 
Problems  Mixed-digit Problems 




55 (35)  
10-centered 49 (39)  52 (40) 
 
47 (41)  




8 (17)  





Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.  
 
Children’s Metacognitive Knowledge related to Decomposition 
Competence and Effort Judgments. As indicated in Table 3, on average, children 
judged themselves to be competent at using decomposition (mean rating = 4.87 out of 6) and 
judged that it would require a fair amount of effort to do so (mean rating = 2.70 out of 6). These 
judgments varied by problem type. Children judged themselves to be more competent at using 
decomposition on single-digit problems than mixed-digit problems, mean rating = 5.09 (SD = 
.97) vs. 4.66 (SD = 1.24), respectively, t(124) = 4.53, p < .001. The reverse was found for 
prospective judgments of effort. Children judged that decomposition would require more effort 
on mixed-digit problems than on single-digit problems, mean rating = 3.07 (SD = 1.50) vs. 2.32 
(SD = 1.11), respectively, t(124) = -7.06, p < .001. 
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 Additionally, competency judgments and anticipated effort were negatively correlated, 
r(124) = -.62, p < .001, indicating that children with higher competency judgments have lower 
anticipated effort ratings. This pattern was predominately driven by children’s responses and 
choices made when judging and solving mixed-digit problems (single digit: r(124) = -.38, p < 
.001; multi digit: r(124) = -.71, p < .001).   
Accuracy of Competence Judgments. To test the accuracy of children’s competence 
judgments, I examined the relation between these judgments and children’s ability to accurately 
execute decomposition on the no-choice task. Correlational analyses indicated that children’s 
average competence judgment was related to their average decomposition accuracy, such that 
children who judged that they were more competent with decomposition also solved problems 
using decomposition with higher levels of accuracy, r(124) = .55, p < .001. This result held even 
when controlling for children’s judgments of their general math competence, r(124) = .55, p < 
.001. While children’s math competency judgments were correlated to their decomposition 
competency judgments, r(124) = .38, p < .001, they were not correlated with decomposition 
accuracy, r(124) = .12, p = .19).    
Further, analyses that examined the relation between competence judgments and 
decomposition accuracy for the six problems presented in both the competence judgments and 
the no-choice arithmetic tasks provided additional evidence of the accuracy of children’s 
metacognitive judgments of competence. As shown in Table 6, correlational analyses indicated 
that the two measures were positively correlated on all six overlapping problems, r’s ranging 





Table 6  
Bivariate Correlations between Competence Judgment and Decomposition Accuracy  
Problem Bivariate Correlation (r) 
4 + 8 .33*** 
6 + 8 .27** 
9 + 7 .34*** 
5 + 16 .34*** 
25 + 7 .40*** 
39 + 4 .35*** 
Note: Problems are listed in order from smallest to largest sum. All p-values were ≤ .001.   
 
Finally, a calibration analysis, similar to that used by Rinne & Mazzocco (2014), 
indicated high alignment between children’s accuracy in solving problems using decomposition 
and their judgments of their competence in executing decomposition on the same problems. Each 
problem presented in both tasks was given a calibration score of either 0, 1, or 2, with 0 
indicating low calibration and 2 indicating high calibration. When the problem was solved 
correctly on the no-choice task, it was assigned a calibration score of 0 if the competence 
judgment was low (1-2), 1 if the competence judgment was moderate (3-4), and 2 if the 
competence judgment was high (5-6). The scale was reversed when children solved the problem 
incorrectly (e.g., competence scores of 1-2 were given a high calibration score of 2). The mean 
extent of calibration on the six problems was high, m = 1.33, SD = .55.  
I predicted that children’s judgments would be more accurate on problems with which 
they have more experience (i.e., single-digit problems), and thus more likely to have received 
more feedback about their ability, than on problems with which they have less experience (i.e., 
mixed-digit problems). A paired-sample t-test comparing calibration on single-digit problems (m 
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= 1.30, SD = .61) and mixed-digit problems (m = 1.35, SD = .64), however, showed that 
calibration scores did not differ by problem type, t(125) = .85, p = .40. 
Factors Influencing Metacognitive Judgments.   
Next, I considered what factors give rise to children’s metacognitive judgments of 
competence and effort.  
Competence Judgments. Competence judgments were expected to be primarily 
informed by past experiences and a history of success (Barron & Hulleman, 2015; Eccles, et al. 
1993; 1998), such that the more often decomposition is used successfully, the greater the 
calibration between ability and competence judgments. Consistent with this idea, calibration 
level and accuracy executing decomposition on the no-choice task were strongly correlated 
r(124) = .79, p = .001, indicating that the children who were highly calibrated were also those 
who had more success using decompostion. This finding was true for both single-digit, r(124) = 
.80 p < .001, and mixed-digit problems, r(124) = .62, p < .001. 
Effort Judgments. In relation to prospective judgments of effort, I predicted that 
children with greater memory capacity and fact fluency would judge decomposition to be less 











Correlations among Anticipated Effort Judgments and Cognitive Resource Variables 








-.48*** -.33*** -.50*** 
Verbal Short-term 
Memory 
-.33*** -.26** -.33*** 
Verbal Working 
Memory 
-.14 -.02 -.20* 
Visuospatial Short-
term Memory 
-.19* -.16 -.18* 
Visuospatial Working 
Memory 
-.29** -.27** -.25** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
 
Thus, I conducted a series of OLS regression models, including only those variables that 
were positively correlated, to test whether memory capacity and fact fluency predicted children’s 
effort judgments across all problems. In the first model, I included all variables, except for verbal 
working memory because it was not correlated with effort judgments on all problems. As shown 
on the left side of Table 10, visuospatial short-term memory and working memory were 
insignificant in Model 1, so a second OLS regression model was conducted after dropping 
visuospatial short-term memory. In Model 2, only verbal short-term memory and fact fluency 
were significant negative predictors of effort judgments on all problems. These results are 
presented on the right side of Table 8. The parsimonious model (Model 2) explained 27% of the 







Standardized OLS Regression Coefficients for Cognitive Resource Variables Predicting 
Anticipated Effort Judgments for All Problems  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
R2 .29 .27 
F 11.94*** 22.63*** 
Fact Fluency -.40*** -.15*** 
Verbal Short-Term Memory -.21* -.14** 
Visuospatial Short-Term Memory .02 - 
Visuospatial Working Memory -.13 - 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
  
Next, I examined the associations between memory capacity/prerequisite knowledge and 
effort for single- and mixed-digit problems separately. First, I ran two models for single-digit 
problems. In model 3, the three factors that were correlated with effort judgments on single-digit 
problems – fact fluency, verbal short-term memory, and visuospatial working memory – were 
entered into the model. The results of the OLS regression model are found in Table 9. Fact 
fluency was the only significant predictor and so the two memory variables were dropped in 
Model 4. Model 4 demonstrated that fact fluency explained 10% of the variance of anticipated 








Table 9  
Standardized OLS Regression Coefficients for Cognitive Resource Variables Predicting 
Anticipated Effort Judgments for Single-Digit Problems 
 
 Model 3 Model 4 
R2 .16 .10 
F 7.51*** 14.63*** 
Fact Fluency -.25** -.33*** 
Verbal Short-Term Memory -.15 - 
Visuospatial Working Memory -.16 - 
**p < .01, ***p < .001  
 
Next, fact fluency as well as all four memory variables were entered into Model 5 to 
predict anticipated effort judgments on mixed-digit problems. Table 10 presents the results of 
this OLS regression model. Fact fluency and verbal short-term memory were the only significant 
predictor variables, and so verbal working memory and visuospatial short-term and working 
memory were dropped from Model 6. The parsimonious model explained 30% of the variance of 












Standardized OLS Regression Coefficients for Cognitive Resource Variables Predicting 
Anticipated Effort Judgments for Mixed-digit Problems 
  
 Model 5 Model 6 
R2 .31 .30 
F 110.03*** 224.53*** 
Fact Fluency -.44*** -.46*** 
Verbal Short-Term Memory -.19*  
Verbal Working Memory -.004 -.20* 
Visuospatial Short-Term Memory -.03 - 
Visuospatial Memory --.11 - 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
 
In sum, fact fluency emerged as the strongest predictor of children’s judgments of 
decomposition effort. After controlling for fact fluency, most memory variables were no longer 
significant predictors. It was only on mixed-digit problems that verbal short-term memory 
predicted judgments of anticipated effort above and beyond fact fluency.  
Influences on Strategy Selection 
Associative processes and metacognitive processes that might influence strategy selection 
are often examined in isolation. In the following analyses, I examine (a) the relation between 
metacognitive knowledge and strategy selection and (b) whether metacognitive judgments of 
competence and effort interact with ability, memory, and fluency to affect strategy selection.  
Metacognitive Knowledge and Strategy Selection.  Correlational analyses of the 
relation between the percentage of problems on which children selected to use decomposition on 
the choice task and children’s competence and effort judgments suggested that these 
metacognitive judgments were involved in strategy selection. As shown in Table 11, competence 
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judgments were positively correlated and effort judgments were negatively correlated to 
decomposition selection across all problems and among mixed-digit problems, but not single-
digit problems. Thus, on average, children with higher average decomposition competency 
judgments and lower anticipated effort ratings choose to use decomposition strategies on a 
greater number of problems.  
Table 11 
Correlations among Decomposition Competency Judgments, Anticipated Effort Judgments, and 
Decomposition Selection 
   
 Decomposition Selection 
 All Problems  Single-Digit Problems  Mixed-Digit Problems 
Competence 
Judgments .41***  .17
+  .46*** 
Effort Judgments -.40***  -.15  -.49*** 
+p = .05, ***p < .001  
 
To determine whether competency and effort judgments uniquely predicted 
decomposition choice, I conducted an OLS regression model in which competence and effort 
judgments were entered simultaneously into a model with decomposition selection as the 
outcome. This analysis was only conducted using data from mixed-digit problems, since the 
judgment  variables were not correlated with decomposition selection for single-digit problems. 
The results of the regression indicated competence judgments was a borderline significant (β = 
.22, p = .05) predictor and effort judgments (β = -.34, p = .003) was a significant predictor of 
decomposition selection. Together the metacognitive knowledge explained 26% of the variance 
(R2 =.26, F(2,123) = 22.27, p < .001), with higher competency judgments and lower effort 
judgments related to more frequent selection of decomposition strategies.    
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To better understand the relation between competence judgments and strategy selection 
on mixed-digit problems, I examined whether the association varies based on level of calibration. 
The SPSS Macros PROCESS was used to calculate a model in which competency judgments 
were entered as the predictor variable (X), percentage of mixed-digit problems on which children 
selected decomposition was entered as the outcome variable (Y), and calibration level was 
entered as the moderator variable (W). The overall model was significant, F (3, 122) = 47.72, p < 
.001, R2 = .54. Both competence (b = -.11, t = -2.05, p = .04) and calibration (b = -.38, t = -2.16, 
p = .03) were related to decomposition selection. In addition, there was a significant competence 
x calibration moderation (b = .15, t = 4.35, p < .001). This moderation is illustrated in Figure 1 
depicting the conditional effects slopes. The interaction was probed by testing the conditional 
effects of competence at three levels of calibration, one standard deviation below the mean, at the 
mean, and one standard deviation above the mean. Competence was significantly related to 
decomposition selection when calibration was at the mean (p < .001) and one standard deviation 
above the mean (p < .001), but not when calibration was one standard deviation below the mean 











Figure 1.  
Conditional Effect of Competence on the Proportion of Problems on which Children Selected a 
Decomposition Strategy 
  
Note: Predicted decomposition selection proportions were calculated at -1, 0, and 1 SD from the 
mean calibration scores (calibration scores equals .69, 1.30, and 1.91, respectively).  
 
Next, I used the Johnson-Neyman technique (Johnson & Fay, 1950) to test for specific 
regions of significance. This technique estimates calibration values at which the simple slopes 
passed the threshold of significance (p < .05). The analysis estimated that the relation between 
competence and strategy selection was significant for children whose calibration was at or below 
.04 (3% of children and at or above 1.02 (60% of children). Thus, for children with mean 
calibrations between approximately 1 and 2, there was a significant correlation between 
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calibration scores also showed significant associations between competence and strategy 
selection.  
Mediating Effects of Metacognitive Knowledge on Strategy Selection. The final set of 
analyses examined whether metacognitive judgments of competence and effort mediate the 
influence of associative processes on strategy selection for mixed-digit problems. Specifically, I 
tested models of the relations among (a) strategy ability, competence judgments, and 
decomposition selection; (b) fact fluency, effort judgments, and strategy selection; and (c) 
memory capacity, effort judgments, and strategy selection.  
Mediation models were conducted using SPSS Macros PROCESS, created by Hayes and 
colleagues (2011), with bias-corrected bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Bootstrapping is 
advantageous, particularly with small and moderate sample sizes, because it does not assume 
normal distribution of the indirect effect. The analyses used 10,000 bootstrap samples with 
replacement from the sample to calculate point estimates. The 95% confidence interval was 
determined based on sampling distribution of the point estimates (Hayes, Preacher, & Myers, 
2011). The indirect effect was considered statistically significant if the 95% confidence interval 
did not include zero (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). All statistics presented in the following 
mediation models are standardized.  
 Strategy ability via competence judgments. Figure 2 presents the results of the model 
testing whether children’s metacognitive knowledge of their competence in executing 
decomposition (competence judgments) mediated the influence of decomposition accuracy on 
the no-choice task (decomposition ability) on the percentage of mixed-digit problems on which 
they selected to use a decomposition strategy on the choice task (decomposition selection). The 
path between decomposition ability and competence judgments (a path) was significant, but 
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when controlling for decomposition ability, the path from competence judgment  to 
decomposition selection (b path) was not significant. Moreover, the direct effect between 
decomposition ability and decomposition selection (c' path) remained significant and the indirect 
effect did not meet the standards of statistical significance (95% CI [-.05, .09]). Thus, the results 
indicated that competence judgments was not a path through which decomposition ability 
predicts selection of decomposition strategies.   
Figure 2 




   
Fact fluency via effort judgments.  Figure 3 presents the results of the model testing 
whether children’s prospective judgments of the effort needed to execute decomposition (effort 
judgments) mediated the influence of accuracy with simple addition facts (fact fluency) on the 
percentage of mixed-digit problems on which they selected to use a decomposition strategy on 
the choice task (decomposition selection). The bias-correct confidence interval of fact fluency on 
decomposition selection through effort judgments met the standards of statistical significance 
(95% CI [.002 to .01]). The direct effect from fact fluency to decomposition selection also 
remained significant. Thus, the results indicated that, on mixed-digit problems, the influence of 






Judgments a = .50***  
b = .06  




Mediation Model: Fact Fluency Predicting Decomposition Selection Through Anticipated Effort  
 
  
Memory capacity via effort judgments. Figure 4 presents the results of the model testing 
whether children’s prospective judgments of the effort needed to execute decomposition (effort 
judgments) mediated the influence of their visuospatial working memory capacity (visuospatial 
working memory) on the percentage of mixed-digit problems on which they selected to use a 
decomposition strategy on the choice task (decomposition selection). Both the indirect effect 
(95% CI [.01 to .04]) and direct effect were significant. Thus, the results indicated that, on 
mixed-digit problems, the influence of visuospatial working memory on decomposition selection 
is mediated by anticipated effort judgments.   
 
Figure 4 





Fact Fluency Decomposition 
Selection 
Effort Judgments a = -.08***  b = -.07*  





Anticipated Effort a = -.18**  b = -.11***  
c' = .06*** 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 Strategy selection is predictive of performance in various domains including early 
arithmetic (e.g., Carr et al., 1994; Coyle & Bjorklund, 1997; Geary et al., 2004; McCarty et al., 
1999; Rittle-Johnson & Siegler, 1999). Given the strong relation between strategy selection and 
arithmetic accuracy (Carr & Alexeev, 2011; Geary et al., 2004; Laski et al., 2016; Ramirez et al., 
2013), this dissertation aimed to address silos in the current literature by pointing to potential 
mechanisms that might explain individual differences in strategy selection during early 
childhood. Specifically, this research introduced metacognitive judgments as important factors 
that influence strategy selection.  
This study was guided by three research goals. The first goal was to examine whether 
children could make two types of metacognitive judgments related to use of a decomposition 
strategy: judgments of their competence and judgments of the amount of anticipated effort. This 
is the first study to examine whether first- and second-grade students can make meaningful 
judgments of their own competence and anticipated effort with a particular strategy that are 
consistent with their actual performance. The second goal was to explore factors that inform 
children’s metacognitive judgments through examining associations between children’s 
decomposition ability and their metacognitive judgments of their own competency, and 
associations between children’s cognitive resources and knowledge – memory and fact fluency – 
and children’s anticipated effort judgments. The final goal was to determine how metacognitive 
judgments fit into a larger model of strategy selection. The Overlapping Waves model has been 
the dominant theoretical framework used to study children’s strategy selection when solving 
various types of problems, including arithmetic problems (Siegler, 1996), but has not previously 
considered the role of metacognitive judgments of competency and anticipated effort. Previous 
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research conducted within this framework has established that the cognitive predictors, including 
strategy ability, working memory, and fact fluency, relate to the frequency in use of mental 
strategies (Foley et al., 2016; Geary, 2011; Geary et al., 2004). This dissertation extended that 
research by examining whether children’s metacognitive judgments serve as mechanisms 
through which the cognitive factors relate to strategy selection. 
Measuring Metacognitive Knowledge 
This dissertation introduced two new measures of children’s metacognitive knowledge: 
judgments of competency and judgments of anticipated effort, and demonstrated that they 
contribute to understanding of a specific localized behavior, arithmetic strategy selection. While 
extant research has examined global and domain-specific measures of metacognitive judgments 
in the context of problem solving (e.g., Bellon, Fias, & De Smedt, 2019; Borkowski et al., 1989; 
Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, & Goodwin, 1986), no research has specifically considered how 
children’s judgments of their own competence or anticipated effort with a specific strategy might 
relate to their strategy selection.    
  Expectancy-Value theory of motivation suggests that judgments of competence and 
anticipated effort can influence decisions simultaneously (e.g., Barron & Hulleman, 2015; Eccles 
et al., 1983; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Lauermann et al., 2015), but research had not yet 
established whether young children’s judgments of competence and effort could be differentiated 
in the context of problem solving. In the present study, competence and effort judgments did in 
fact each uniquely relate to strategy selection. This finding shows that judgments of competence 
and anticipated effort of a strategy are not entirely conflated in first- and second-grade students. 
Children do not automatically base their competence judgments off of how much effort they 
think is required.  
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 This pattern of findings differs from previous motivation research that has examined 
children’s associations between general competence and effort attributions. Cross-sectional 
research on children’s and adolescents’ views of the relation between competence and effort have 
shown that young children view the two constructs as positively correlated, suggesting they 
confound effort with competence and believe that people who work harder are also more 
competent in that domain (Folmer et al., 2008; Nicholls, 1978; Nicholls & Miller, 1984). This 
relation is inverted in older children and adolescents, such that youth eventually begin to 
attribute greater effort with lower competence (Folmer et al., 2008; Nicholls, 1978; Nicholls & 
Miller, 1984). In the present study, however, children’s judgments of competence and anticipated 
effort were inversely correlated, indicating that children do view themselves as more competent 
with the same problems that they expect will require less effort. When considering their own 
specific competence and effort with a particular strategy in a context of which they are quite 
familiar, children are able to make more sophisticated judgments and view effort and competence 
as inversely related.  
The present research is the first study to measure children’s prospective judgments of 
competence and anticipated effort when solving arithmetic problems. Previous research that has 
measured competence judgments in the context of arithmetic has utilized tools that ask children 
to judge whether a presented answer is correct, in essence measuring children’s judgments of 
their confidence in recognizing a correct answer. Additionally, children are only asked to judge 
their competence after they have already responded to the problem (Bellon et al., 2019; Rinne & 
Mazzocco, 2014). This retrospective method should have less ecological validity, particularly 
when considering children’s strategy selection, since children must select their strategy before 
solving a problem. Although the current research cannot make any directional claims, the use of 
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prospective reports of metacognitive judgments should best align with how children make and 
use these judgments in real problem-solving scenarios.   
The only known research that specifically examined the association between arithmetic 
strategies and a judgments of effort relied on a global effort attribution scale (Carr et al., 1994). 
The effort attribution questions asked children to attribute hypothetical success to either effort or 
ability (Carr et al., 1994; Crandall, Katkovsky, & Crandall, 1965). This type of questionnaire 
measures children’s likelihood to attribute success to effort or ability, which in essence measures 
children’s theories of intelligence (Dweck, 2006; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, M-S Lin, & Wan, 1999) 
and strongly differs from the current measure of anticipated effort. To my knowledge, 
prospective judgments of anticipated effort in this context have not been previously measured. 
The present study argues that anticipated effort might also be an important predictor of 
performance through influencing children’s likelihood to use a certain approach to solve a 
problem.  
Children’s Judgments of Competence and Effort 
On average, first- and second-graders reported that they believe they are generally 
competent with decomposition and they anticipated that decomposition requires a modest 
amount of effort. Interestingly, there was between-children variability in metacognitive 
judgments as well as variability in how aligned their competency judgments were with their 
actual problem-solving accuracy.  
Competence Judgment Accuracy. Calibration refers to the correspondence between 
individuals’ judgments about their competence and their actual competence (Alexander, 2013; 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982), and is referred to as one of the four cornerstones of 
research on metacognitive judgments (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013). Inaccurate calibration, 
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resulting in overconfident or underconfident beliefs about ability can result in inappropriate 
decisions about how to study material or approach problems (Lin & Zabrucky, 1998; Zabrucky 
& Moore, 1994). The present research provides the first evidence to date that children are able to 
make moderately accurate, or well calibrated, metacognitive judgments of their own competency 
with an arithmetic strategy. The pattern of finding indicates that children viewed themselves as 
more competent with using decomposition on problems they were actually able to answer 
correctly using decomposition. Therefore, children of this age do not all strongly overestimate 
their competence ability with decomposition, but can often make judgments in line with their 
actual ability.  
Results from the measure of calibration must be interpreted cautiously, however. The 
measure of competence judgments was negatively skewed, such that more children had high 
competence judgments than low competence judgments. Additionally, almost all children who 
were well-calibrated also viewed themselves as highly competent. The present study did not 
include many children who were highly-calibrated and judged that they had low competence 
with decomposition. Thus, the current research is not able to determine whether children are able 
to correctly identify situations when they are not competent with decomposition. The general 
positive association between calibration and decomposition, however, is in line with previous 
research, which has demonstrated that children who were more highly calibrated were also more 
accurate at problem solving (Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013; Kuncel, Credé, & Thomas, 2005).   
Factors that Give Rise to Judgments. The present research proposed that children’s 
decomposition ability would influence their competence judgments, and that their cognitive 
resources and prerequisite knowledge would influence their anticipated effort judgments. 
Additionally, it was predicted that children’s metacognitive judgments would differ based on 
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problem characteristics, and thus children would have higher competence judgments and lower 
anticipated effort judgments on single-digit problems as compared with mixed-digit problems.  
In the present study, children who were more accurate when executing decomposition 
strategies also had higher competence judgments as well as higher calibration of their 
competency judgments. Rinne & Mazzocco (2014) explored the directionality of the association 
between calibration and arithmetic accuracy and determined that the relation is bidirectional: 
high accuracy leads to higher calibration and high calibration contributes to long-term increases 
in accuracy. In the context of the present research, this finding would suggest that children who 
are better able to use decomposition accurately develop more precise judgments of their own 
competency with decomposition, and that feelings of competence with decomposition could 
encourage students to use decomposition more often in the future. The current research design 
cannot establish directionality of the associations among ability, competence, and competence 
calibration, but the positive correlations provide initial theoretical support that more experience 
solving addition problems correctly using decomposition should lead to higher competency 
judgments and a more accurate gage of competence with decomposition.  
Although feelings of competence might encourage children to rely on a certain strategy 
because they assume they will be able to get the correct answer to the problem, anticipated effort 
judgments might encourage or discourage children from using a strategy because of how hard 
children believe they will have to work to use a particular strategy. Thus, it is important to 
establish what factors influence children’s judgments about how much effort might be required to 
use a particular strategy. The present research found significant associations between 
components of short-term and working memory, arithmetic fact fluency, and anticipated effort 
judgments. It was noteworthy that two constructs that were previously found to be related to 
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children’s likelihood of using decomposition strategies, visuospatial working memory and fact 
fluency (Geary et al., 2004; Laski et al., 2013; Lemaire & Callies, 2009; Shen et al., 2016; 
Siegler, 1996), were both independently negatively associated with children’s anticipated effort 
judgments with decomposition. This suggests that children who have better visuospatial working 
memory or better fact fluency viewed decomposition as requiring less effort, as compared with 
children with lower visuospatial working memory or fact fluency skills. When visuospatial 
working memory and fact fluency were examined together as predictors of effort judgments, 
only fact fluency explained the majority of the variance in the regression model. Thus, 
visuospatial skills appear less important in predicting children’s anticipated effort judgments than 
fact fluency. This is not surprising, since retrieval of basic arithmetic facts is always necessary 
when decomposing larger problems.  
From an educational standpoint, the finding that fact fluency has a larger influence than 
visuospatial working memory on effort judgments is promising because fact fluency is more 
easily addressed by teachers. Fact fluency is a common core standard in first grade (National 
Governors Association Center for Best Practices, Council of Chief State School Officers, 2010), 
and thus is often a focus in most elementary classes. Although children’s working memory 
improves throughout development (Gathercole, 1999; Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & 
Wearing, 2004; Pickering, 2001), quick improvement requires intensive, high-quality training 
(Holmes & Gathercole, 2014; Klingberg, 2010; Ramani, Jaeggi, Daubert, & Buschkuehl, 2017). 
Thus, fact fluency should be a much easier focus if teachers aim to help students feel that 
decomposition strategies do not require too much effort.  
Verbal short-term memory was also negatively related to effort judgments. This finding 
was surprising because verbal memory has not previously been associated with decomposition 
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selection or accuracy (Foley et al., 2016; Geary, 2011). It is plausible that verbal short-term 
memory is important when executing decomposition strategies because children must keep track 
of the various steps of the problem. If a child solves 17 + 6 by decomposing the problem into 7 + 
3 = 10, 10 + 10 =20, and 20 +3= 23, the child must keep track of the 10 that has been 
decomposed from 17, and then must keep track of the second 3 that has been decomposed from 
the 6. Therefore, children who have strong verbal short-term memory might view decomposition 
as requiring less effort, as compared with children who have weaker verbal short-term memory 
capacities. Verbal working memory and visuospatial short-term memory were only associated 
with effort judgments on mixed-digit problems. This could suggest that children who have higher 
memory capacity in general view difficult problems as requiring less effort, as compared with 
children with lower overall memory capacity. Future research is necessary to further explore the 
roles of various components of memory on effort judgments and to understand why two 
components – visuospatial working and verbal short-term memory – might be more influential 
on effort judgments of decomposition than other components.  
 To examine whether children consider problem type when making metacognitive 
judgments, children were asked to report judgments for both single-digit and mixed-digit 
problems. Findings that children had given similar ratings across the single- and mixed-digit 
problems would have suggested that they made global metacognitive judgments related to the 
use of the decomposition strategy. In the present study, however, children’s metacognitive 
judgments of competence and effort differed between single-digit and mixed-digit problems, 
suggesting that children do in fact consider the context and problem when judging their own 
competence or anticipated effort. Children judged that they were more competent with single-
digit problems than mixed-digit problems and anticipated that single-digit problems would 
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require less effort than mixed-digit problems. First- and second-grade students are typically less 
accurate when solving mixed-digit problem as compared with single-digit problems (e.g., Geary, 
2011; Laski et al., 2016), and findings from the present study indicate that children might in fact 
view these problems as being more difficult to solve using decomposition, both in terms of 
anticipated accuracy and required effort.  
Unlike raw competence and effort judgments, however, calibration of competence did not 
differ by problem type. Calibration should be improved through feedback and experience with 
success (Barron et al., 2018; Rinne & Mazzocco, 2014). Thus, it was surprising that children’s 
competence judgments were not more highly calibrated on single-digit problems as compared 
with mixed-digit problems. I propose three alternative explanations for this finding. The first 
explanation posits that experience does not actually affect the accuracy of children’s competence 
judgments with arithmetic strategies. Alternatively, children could have equal experience solving 
single- and mixed-digit addition problems. Both of these explanations seem unlikely because it 
does not seem feasible that young children are able to develop moderately accurate competence 
judgments without any influence from their experience, and children learn to solve single-digit 
problems before mixed-digit problems, ensuring they have more experience solving single-digit 
problems. The third explanation suggests that there might be some sort of threshold of 
experience after which experience no longer strongly influencing accuracy of competence 
judgments. Research with undergraduates suggests that prior experience, problem characteristics, 
and guessing all contribute to students’ confidence judgments (Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013). 
Thus, factors that can influence how a student judges the difficulty of a problem or themselves as 
a math problem-solver, such as math self-efficacy or math anxiety, might interfere with 
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children’s ability to accurately judge their own competency in tasks for which they have a lot of 
experience.  
Role of Competence and Effort on Strategy Selection.  
Competence and anticipated effort judgments were both related to strategy selection. 
Children who had higher judgments of their own competency also used decomposition more 
frequently. Similarly, children who anticipated that decomposition would require less effort used 
decomposition with greater frequency. When considered together, anticipated effort was a 
stronger predictor of decomposition selection than competence judgments. This result might be 
due, in part, to a limitation of the scales used to measure each construct; given that the effort 
scale was less skewed and had greater variability than the competence scale.  
Metacognitive judgments were considered within an existing framework of strategy 
selection through examining whether they served as mechanisms that help explain associations 
between previously noted predictors and strategy selection.  
 Competence Judgments. Previous research has noted that children who are better able 
to execute decomposition do in fact select decomposition with greater frequency (Lemaire, 2010; 
Lemaire & Callies, 2009; Siegler & Lemaire, 1997; Torbeyns et al., 2004). The present study 
posited that children who are better able to use decomposition might choose that strategy more 
frequently because they view themselves as more competent with decomposition. Although 
competence judgments were independently related to strategy selection, when examined together 
with decomposition ability as predictors of decomposition selection, decomposition ability 
appeared to be a stronger predictor than competence judgments. Mediation analysis was used to 
examine the theoretical assertion that competence judgments could be a mechanism through 
which decomposition ability relates to decomposition selection. Competence judgments did not 
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serve as a significant mediator in this model. This result is unsurprising considering that only 
children who are highly calibrated exhibited an association between decomposition competence 
and choice, and thus the competence judgments appear less important for those children who are 
not highly calibrated.  
The current findings of associations between competence and accuracy for children who 
are highly calibrated can be framed within the existing framework of the Overlapping Waves 
model. Initial success with a strategy should increase children’s competency judgments, which 
should increase the frequency in which children use that strategy. According to Overlapping 
Waves model, after gaining a lot of experience solving a type of problem successfully with a 
particular strategy, children develop strong associations between the strategy and success. It is 
quite feasible that at this point, children’s judgments of their competence become less impactful 
as strategy choices are not driven entirely by strong associations between strategy and success 
for a given problem type.  
The finding that only children who were moderately or highly calibrated (above the 
median) demonstrated associations between competency judgments and strategy selection could 
suggest that children have some awareness of their calibration. Children who are more certain 
about their competency judgments are more likely to rely on those judgments when selecting 
strategies. Children who are not certain about their competency judgments might ignore their 
feelings of competence, and instead rely on other factors or associations to help select strategies. 
Therefore, in educational settings, it could be beneficial to provide children with a lot of 
feedback regarding their strategy abilities to help them understand where they are competent and 
where they still need to improve. Children who feel they are unable to judge their own 
competence with a strategy may persist in relying on more rudimentary strategies. Thus, it is 
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essential that children do not underestimate their own competence with more advanced 
strategies. Children who rely on competence judgments that underestimate their actual ability 
will lose important experience using more advanced strategies.  
 Effort Judgments. The association between cognitive resources and knowledge – 
including visuospatial working memory and fact fluency – and arithmetic performance is well 
reported. Both visuospatial working memory and fact fluency are positively related to arithmetic 
accuracy, as well as to decomposition selection (Geary et al., 2004; Laski et al., 2013; Lemaire & 
Callies, 2009; Shen et al., 2016; Siegler, 1996). The Overlapping Waves model suggests that 
children who are better equipped with the skills necessary to execute decomposition strategies 
will do so with greater accuracy. These children will form stronger associations between 
decomposition selection and accuracy, thus encouraging them to continue to use decomposition 
on similar problems in the future. The present study does not dispute this theory, but 
hypothesized that children with stronger cognitive resources or knowledge might be encouraged 
to use decomposition more frequently because they view the strategy as requiring low amounts 
of effort.  
Consistent with previous research (Geary et al., 2004; Laski et al., 2013; Lemaire & 
Callies, 2009; Shen et al., 2016; Siegler, 1996), associations were detected between 
decomposition selection and visuospatial memory and fact fluency. The current study also 
demonstrated that anticipated effort judgments partially mediated these associations. This 
suggests that children who have better visuospatial working memory or better fact fluency view 
decomposition as requiring less effort and then use decomposition with greater frequency when 
selecting a strategy.  
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Decomposition requires certain prerequisite knowledge (Geary et al., 2004; Laski et al., 
2014) and is thought to be more taxing on working memory than other arithmetic strategies 
(Foley et al., 2016; Imbo & Vandierendonck, 2007, 2010). Children only need knowledge of 
certain necessary facts to solve any particular problem and likely only require a particular 
amount of working memory capacity. It is possible that anticipated effort is a factor that 
differentiates the children with high fact fluency or working memory capacity who use 
decomposition frequently from the children with lower but still sufficient fact fluency and 
working memory capacity who use decomposition infrequently. The former group of children 
might use decomposition with greater frequency because they do not anticipate decomposition 
will be as effortful.  
Expectancy-Value theory posits that one factor that influences decisions is the cost 
attributed to each option (Barron & Hulleman, 2015). If children view one strategy as requiring 
significantly more effort than another strategy, they may view the cost of that strategy as too 
high, and select an alternate strategy. Although counting strategies typically require more steps 
and more time, particularly on complex problems, for young children, counting also requires 
fewer cognitive resources and less knowledge (Geary et al., 2004; Imbo & Vandierendonck, 
2007). Thus, children might view the cost of using counting strategies as lower than 
decomposition strategy because children assume counting strategies will require less effort.  
The Roles of Experience and Problem Characteristics. Metacognitive judgments of 
effort and competence were not significant predictors of decomposition selection for single-digit 
problems. There are two potential explanations for this finding. The first explanation relates to 
the reality that first- and second-grade students have likely been solving single-digit addition 
problems since kindergarten, if not longer (National Governors Association Center for Best 
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Practices, Council of Chief State School Officers, 2010). This breadth of experience could result 
in such strong associations between strategies and success that that role of metacognitive 
judgments becomes irrelevant. Metacognitive judgments might only be important when solving 
problems in which children have less experience. Children’s associations between strategy type 
and accuracy are not as strong for problems in which children have less experience, and thus 
strategy selection may be more strongly influenced by metacognitive judgments.  
An alternative explanation posits that the children in this study have equivalent effort and 
competence judgments for decomposition strategies and counting strategies. Metacognitive 
judgments might only impact strategy choice when the problem solvers’ metacognitive 
judgments differ across strategy types. Consider a child who expects that she is equally likely to 
get the right answer using count-on as she is when using decomposition when solving the 
problem 8 + 3. If this child also views counting-on 3 beginning from 8 as requiring the same 
amount of effort as recalling that 8 + 2 = 10 and then adding 1 more (decomposition), her 
judgments of competency or effort shouldn’t necessarily affect her strategy selection because the 
judgments would be as likely to influence the use of count-on as they would the use 
decomposition. Thus, it is important to consider when metacognitive judgments might be 
impactful on strategy selection.  
  Most children in the current study chose one of two strategies for solving each addition 
problem – count-on or decomposition. Previous research has examined children’s progression 
with the count-on strategy. When children initially begin to use count-on strategies, they often 
consistently count-on from the first addend in the problem (e.g., when solving 4 + 6, they will 
count up 6 beginning from 4). New users of count-on follow this algorithm, regardless of 
whether the larger number is the first or second addend (Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). Initially, after 
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children have discovered or been taught to count-on from the larger number, they persist in 
counting on from the first addend. When faced with challenging problems in which it is 
particularly advantageous to count on from the second addend (e.g., 2 + 21) however, children 
are much more likely to count on from the larger addend (Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). Most likely, 
repeated experiences with problems such as that help children shift to consistently counting-on 
from the larger addend. It is plausible that children would not anticipate that it would take more 
effort to count on 6 from 4 than to count on 4 from 6, and that they believe they are equally 
likely to reach the correct answer with both approaches. In these situations, metacognitive 
judgments might not affect whether children count on from the smaller addend or the larger 
addend. When faced with a problem such as 2 + 21, however, children might recognize that it 
would require much more effort and they would be much less likely to reach the correct answer 
if they count on 21 from 2 than if they count on 2 from 21.   
The present study finding that competence and effort judgments are related to 
decomposition selection for mixed-digit problems suggest that children’s metacognitive 
judgments for decomposition might differ from their metacognitive judgments for other 
strategies, such as count-on. In the case of a child who understands the base-10 number structure 
and can recall that 5 + 5 = 10, solving 25 + 7 using decomposition might not appear to require a 
large amount of effort and might seem to be an effective way to reach the correct sum. 
Decomposition might appear to require less effort than counting on from 25. For a child who 
does not easily identify how to decompose 25 + 7 or cannot recall simple arithmetic facts, it is 
likely that count-on will appear to be less effortful and more likely to lead to the correct answer 
than decomposition. Thus, metacognitive judgments are likely to become more important in 
problems in which metacognitive judgments vary across strategy type. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Recommendations for future directions of research on the role of metacognition in 
strategy selection are suggested based on limitations of the current study. The first limitation 
pertains to the way strategy selection was measured. In the present study, strategy selection was 
determined by the percentage of problems in which children chose to use decomposition. 
Decomposition selection was used because it is an essential strategy for first- and second-grade 
students to master, and is more mathematically advanced than the alternative counting strategies. 
In this sample, however, children used a variety of strategies. It is feasible that children’s 
judgments of other strategies, particularly count-on, which is very prevalent in children of this 
age, influence children’s likelihood to select to use decomposition. Due to constraints in time 
with child participants, the present study did not assess children’s metacognitive judgments of 
competence and effort with other strategies beyond decomposition. Future research should build 
upon the current findings by examining metacognition with other prevalent strategies in order to 
understand how judgments differ across strategies and how judgments of other strategies might 
relate to children’s likelihood to use decomposition.  
 Additionally, children’s metacognitive judgments were only measured using a Likert-
scale questionnaire. Children did not provide explanations for their answers, and thus it is 
impossible to know whether children’s metacognitive judgments were truly a reflection of their 
metacognitive judgments when using decomposition or their judgments when solving the 
problem more generally. Because children’s metacognitive judgments were highly correlated 
with their decomposition ability and decomposition selection, it is probable that children’s 
responses did in fact reflect their judgments with the decomposition strategy. This assertion 
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could be further supported by future research that measures children’s metacognitive judgments 
with other strategies.  
 Second, the present study only examined children at one point in time, and all students 
were in either first or second grade, and thus this study cannot speak to changes in associations 
throughout development. The Overlapping Waves model posits that children form strong 
associations between strategy and success on particular types of problems and should thus have 
weaker associations between strategy and accuracy for problems in which the children are less 
experienced (Siegler, 1996). It is plausible that metacognitive judgments are more important 
when solving less-familiar problems because strategy selection might be more deliberate and less 
automatic. In order to examine this hypothesis, it is important to replicate this research with 
children at a variety of developmental levels in order to assess whether there are certain 
developmental points, or periods in arithmetic learning trajectories, when metacognition seems 
most relevant to strategy selection.  
Third, in addition to examining use of metacognition longitudinally, it would be 
informative to better understand how metacognitive judgments influence strategy selection. 
Metacognition might influence strategy through conscious consideration (Case, 1978; Kuhn, 
1988) or it might have a more implicit influence on strategy selection (Greeno et al., 1984; 
Halford, 1993). The present study presents a relation between metacognitive judgments and 
strategy selection but is not indicative of the process by which metacognitive judgments exert 
influence on strategy selection. Whereas explicit metacognitive judgments can be measured 
through the use of questionnaires that require reflection or thought, implicit metacognitive 
judgments can be measured using techniques that require people to immediately report how 
confident they are that a presented answer is correct (Roderer & Roebers, 2010). In order to 
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assess whether children’s metacognitive judgments are explicit or implicit, future research could 
require children to make conscious decisions about their judgments for particular strategies 
through requiring that they take a certain amount of time before responding, as well as 
immediate reports of their judgments by requiring children to respond within a few seconds. 
Comparing the strengths of associations between the measure of explicit metacognitive 
judgments and the measure of implicit judgments with children strategy selection could provide 
early evidence as to how metacognitive judgments might influence strategy decisions.  
Fourth, the current study cannot fully explain associations between metacognitive 
judgments and strategy selection. The extent of the relations between competence judgments and 
decomposition ability and selection remain unclear since competence was related to both ability 
and selection but was not related to selection above and beyond ability. It is possible that 
competence judgments are an important factor in strategy decisions, but a more rigorous measure 
of competency judgments is necessary in order to measure the full effect. The finding that only 
children who are highly calibrated relied on competence judgments when making strategy 
decisions could suggest that a measure that considers both children confidence in their own 
ability and confidence in their judgments of their own ability is necessary. Alternatively, 
competence judgments might not be a significant predictor of decomposition selection, and 
instead there might be another common construct that is being measured by both the 
decomposition ability and decomposition competency judgment measures, such as a previously 
formed association between the strategy and accuracy, which can explain the correlation between 
the two measures. In the future, research should explore additional measures of strategy 
competency in relation to strategy ability and selection.  
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Additionally, effort judgments do not explain the entire relation between cognitive 
resources/prerequisite knowledge and decomposition selection. Thus, an important future 
direction is to explore the role of effort in relation to other self-regulatory processes, such as 
math anxiety. There is a well-reported relation between math anxiety and math achievement 
(Ashcraft & Krause, 2007; Ganley & Vasilyeva, 2014; Ramirez et al., 2012, 2013). Furthermore, 
math anxiety negatively relates to use of memory-based arithmetic strategies, such as 
decomposition, and use of memory-based strategies positively relates to math achievement 
(Ramirez et al., 2016).  This is likely, in part because math anxiety taxes children’s working 
memory capacity (Beilock, 2008), making it harder for children to rely on their working memory 
when executing decomposition strategies (Ramirez et al., 2016). In the present study, effort 
judgments only partially mediated the association between visuospatial working memory and 
decomposition selection and there might be additional factors that are influencing some of the 
paths in the current model. It is plausible that children who are more math anxious but also have 
higher working memory view decomposition as requiring more effort than they would if they did 
not have high math anxiety because of consistent experiences of anxiety taxing with their 
working memory. The model posited in the current study might accurately represent children 
with low working memory and children with high working memory and low math anxiety, but 
might be improved by including the role of anxiety, which might be particularly important in 
children with high working memory and high math anxiety.  
Math anxiety has been shown to influence metacognition in older children. In fact, 
metacognition – measured by a latent variable that encompassed self-regulation, self-image, 
strategy application, and motivation – mediated the association between math anxiety and 
performance on a word problem-solving math task, suggesting math anxiety might interfere with 
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the development of effective metacognitive skills in math, which in turn relates to lower 
problem-solving accuracy (Lai, Zhu, Chen, & Li, 2015). This research, however, did not consider 
the role of children’s cognitive resources in problem solving and did not measure how math 
anxiety might uniquely influence various types of metacognitive judgments. An important next 
step in this body of research is to examine whether math anxiety relates to children’s 
metacognitive judgments of how much effort is required to use decomposition and if this in turn 
influences strategy selection and problem-solving accuracy.  
 Fifth, the generalizability of these findings is constrained due to the limited sample. 
Children in this study are predominantly from families who are middle or high income, the 
majority are white, and are all from the same state. There is extensive evidence of differences in 
various components of math performance including arithmetic across children from various 
socioeconomic backgrounds (Huttenlocher, Jordan, & Levine, 1994; Jordan, Huttenlocher, & 
Levine, 1992; Laski et al., 2016; Reardon, 2011). The current sample did not exhibit strong 
differences due to parental education or income, but this might be due to the fact that there was 
not a huge amount of variability. It is important that this research be extended to include children 
from a variety of backgrounds and educational contexts.  
Lastly, although mediation analyses were used in this study, the analyses were based 
solely on correlational data, and so this does not provide any causal information. The present 
research therefore only provides the groundwork for future more extensive and experimental 
investigations of the role of metacognition in strategy selection.  
Conclusion 
 Children’s mathematical accuracy and development is contingent on their decisions to 
use and master a variety of strategies. Strategy choice in early elementary school could have 
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long-lasting implications for children’s math trajectories. Thus, it is critical that educators know 
how to best help children learn to make adaptive decisions about strategy selection. The first step 
to designing impactful educational materials is understanding the factors that influence 
performance and strategy judgments. This is the first research to establish significant associations 
between children’s competence and anticipated effort judgments and the frequency in which they 
select a particular arithmetic strategy. In order to best understand strategy selection, it is essential 
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Appendix A: Memory Span Tasks 
Digit Span Forward 
Forward: Start at Item 1. DISCONTINUE after scores of 0 on both trials of an item. 
Say, “I am going to say some numbers. Listen carefully, and when I am through, say them 
right after me. Just say what I say.” Proceed to Trial 1 of Item 1. 
Item Trial Trial Score Item Score 




0      1 
0      1 
0      1     2 
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0      1     2 
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0      1 
0      1     2 
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0      1 
0      1     2 




0      1 
0      1 
0      1     2 
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0      1 
0      1     2 




0      1 
0      1 
0      1     2 




0      1 
0      1 
0      1     2 
 








Digit Span Backward 
Backward: Sample, then Item 1. DISCONTINUE after scores of 0 on both trials of an item. 
Sample – Trial 1: Say, “Now I am going to say some more numbers, but this time when I stop, I want you to 
say them backward. If I say 8—2, what would you say?” If correct [2—8]: Say, “That’s right.” Go to Trial 1 of 
Item 1. If incorrect, say, “That’s not quite right. I said 8—2, so to say it backward, you should say 2—8.”  
Sample – Trial 2: Say, “Let’s try these numbers. Remember, you are to say them backward: 5—6. 
• Correct response [6—5]: Say, “That’s right” Proceed to Trial 1 of Item 1. 
• Incorrect response: Say, “That’s not quite right. I said 5—6, so to say it backward, you should say 6—5. 
Let’s try again: 5—6. If correct [6—5]: Say, “That’s right.” Go to Trial 1 of Item 1. If Incorrect: Say, “that’s 
not quite right. I said 5—6, so to say it backward, you should say 6—5.” Go to Trial 1 of Item 1. 
 
Item Trial Trial Score Item Score 
Sample:   Trial 1 
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Corsi Block Forward 
 
Start at Item 1. DISCONTINUE after scores of 0 on both trials of an item. 
 
Say, “I am going to tap some blocks on this board. Your job is to remember exactly how I 
tap the blocks. When I have finished tapping, I want you to tap the same blocks in the same 
order. When you are done, then I will tap some more blocks. Each time it will get a little 
trickier -- I’ll tap more and more blocks.” 
 
If a participant starts the task while the examiner is still tapping blocks, say: “Please wait until I 
have finished.”  
 
 
Item Trial Trial Score Item Score 
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(Max = 16) 
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Corsi Block Backward 
 
Sample, then Item 1. DISCONTINUE after scores of 0 on both trials of an item.  
   DO NOT say numbers out loud while tapping. 
 
Sample – Trial 1 
Say, “Now I am going to tap some blocks again, but this time I want you to tap the blocks in 
backward or reverse order--that is, you should start with the last block I tapped and finish with the 
first. So, if I tap [3-9], you will tap . . . ? 
• Correct response [tap 9-3]: Say, “That’s right.” Proceed to Trial 1 of Item 1. 
• Incorrect response: Say, “That’s not quite right. I tapped [3—9], so to tap it 
backward, you should tap [9-3]. You should switch the order.” Proceed to S. Trial 2. 
Sample – Trial 2 
Say, “Let’s try these blocks. Remember, your job is to tap them backward: [tap 5—6]. 
• Correct response [tap 6—5]: Say, “That’s right” Proceed to Trial 1 of Item 1. 
• Incorrect response: Say, “That’s not quite right. I tapped [5—6], so to tap it 
backward, you should tap [6—5]. You should switch the order. Let’s try again: [5—
6]. 
o Correct response [tap 6—5]: Say, “That’s right.” Proceed to Trial 1 of Item 1. 
o Incorrect response: Say, “That’s not quite right. I tapped [5—6], so to tap it 
backward, you should tap [6—5].” Proceed to Trial 1 of Item 1. 
 
Reminders are allowed after the child makes an error. Say, “Remember, it’s your job to tap it 
backward, or switch the order.” 
 
Item Trial Trial Score Item Score 
Sample:   Trial 1 
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Appendix B: Fact Fluency Problems 



































Appendix C: Metacognitive Judgment Tasks 
































I want to know how you feel about solving addition problems by breaking them up into smaller 
problems. Let’s say, I have the problem 9 + 8. There are different ways I could solve this. But if I 
was going to use “breaking it up,” this is what I might do. First, I would figure out how to break 
it up to get 10. I have 9, so I need one more: 9 + 1 is 10. I took the 1 from the 8 to make 10, now 
I have 7 left. Now, all I have to do is add 10 + 7….that’s 17! See how I solved 9+8 by “breaking 
it up” into problems that were easier for me-- first, I broke it up to make 10 then I added what 
was left--and got the answer…9+ 8 equals 17.  
 
Do you understand what I mean by “breaking it up”? Good. That’s what I want you to think 
about for all the problems I’m going to show you. I know you might be able to solve these 
problems in another way, but I want you to tell me how you would feel if you could only use 
breaking it up.   
 
COMPETENCE BLOCK:  
Some {first/second} graders think they would be good at using “breaking it up” to solve 
problems and others don’t, and some kids think they would good at using breaking-it-up on some 
problems but not others. I’m asking kids how good they think they are at breaking-it-up to figure 
out when teachers need to help.   
 
I want you to tell me how good you are at solving problems by “breaking them up.” You don’t 
actually need to solve the problems I show you. For each problem, I just want you to tell me how 
good you think you would be at getting the right answer if you had to solve it by “breaking it 
up.”  
 
You can point to any of these smiley faces to describe how good you think you would be. This 
face over here [point to left most face] means you think you would not be good at all. This face 
over here [point to right most face] means you think you would be very good. You can point to 
any of these faces [point to each face one at a time from left to right] to show me how good you 
think you would be at solving the problem by breaking it up.  
 




Good! Remember, it is okay if you don’t think you would do a good job getting the right answer 
if you only could use “breaking it up.” So we can help teachers teach you better, it is really 
important to tell me what you really think.  
 
Let’s do some practice questions to make sure you understand how to use these faces to describe 
what you think. Ready? Ok.  
 
Imagine you had to walk by yourself from here to the cafeteria. How good do you think you 
would be at walking to the cafeteria? I think I would be very good at that. I would point to this 
face [point to right most face]. 
Now imagine you had to hop on one leg to get from your classroom to the cafeteria without ever 
stopping to take a break or putting your foot down [show picture of child hopping on one foot]? 
I think I would only be a tiny bit good, so I would probably point to this face [point to 2nd face]. 
What about you?  
 
Now imagine you had to eat an ice cream cone without making a mess, how good do you think 
you would do at eating it without dripping any ice cream on your clothes or the table [show 
picture of ice cream cone]? Which face matches what you think? I think I would do a pretty 
good job at that, so I would pick this face [point to fourth face].  
 
You’ve got it! Now, you will do the same thing to tell me how you think you would do if you 
had to solve some addition problems by breaking them up. Remember, when you use breaking it 
up, you break the numbers in a problem apart to solve the problem. You take one problem and 
break it up into smaller problems.   
Before each item say: Remember, if you point to this face it means you don’t think you would 
do a good job at all if you could only solve the problem by breaking it up. But if you point to this 
face, it means you think you would do a very good job using breaking it up on the problem. You 
can also point to any of these faces [point to four faces in the middle] if you think you’re 
somewhere in between, like I was with hopping on one foot and eating ice cream without 
dripping.   
 
For each item, say: Imagine that you could only solve [read problem and point to card with 
problem written on it] by breaking it up into smaller problems. How good do you think you 
would be at solving it by breaking it up? 
 
EFFORT BLOCK:  
 
I am going to ask you some questions about how hard you think you would have to work to get 
the right answer to problems if you could only solve it using breaking it up. You are going to use 
dots of different sizes to show me hard you think you would have to work.   
 
Let’s do some practice questions first to make sure you understand what the circles mean. 
Ready? 
 
Imagine you had to run around your whole school six times without stopping [show picture of 
child running]? [Show child card with large blue circle and small green circle] Do you think 
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you have to work hard or not work hard? This circle [point to blue circle] means you think you 
would have to work hard and this circle [point to green circle] means you think you would not 
have to work hard. Pick a circle to show me if you think you would have to work hard or not.  
 
If child picks large blue circle, show blue array 
You said you think you would have to work hard to run around the school 6 times. Do you think 
you would have to work very hard [point to largest blue circle], pretty hard [point to middle 
blue circle], or kind of hard [point to smallest blue circle].  
 
If child picks small green circle, show green array 
You said you think you would not have to work hard to run around the school 6 times. Do you 
think you would have to work a little hard [point to largest green circle], a tiny bit hard [point to 
middle green circle], or not hard at all [point to smallest green circle].  
 
Imagine if you had to spell the word “paragraph” [show picture of child thinking]?  How hard 
do you think you would have to work to spell it correctly. Do you think you would you have to 
work hard [point to blue circle] or not work hard [point to green circle[? 
 
If child picks large blue circle, show blue array 
You said you think you would have to work hard to spell paragraph. Do you think you would 
have to work very hard [point to largest blue circle], pretty hard [point to middle blue circle], or 
kind of hard [point to smallest blue circle].  
 
If child picks small green circle, show green array 
You said you think you would not have to work hard to spell paragraph. Do you think you would 
you have to work a little hard [point to largest green circle], a tiny bit hard [point to middle 
green circle], or not hard at all [point to smallest green circle]?  
 
You’ve got it! Now, you will do the same thing to tell me how you hard you think you would 
have to work to solve different addition problems by breaking them up. Remember, when you 
use breaking it up, you break the numbers in a problem apart to solve the problem. You take one 
problem and break it up into smaller problems.   
 
Good! Remember, it is okay if you think you would have to work hard, or if you don’t think you 
would have to work hard, or if you think somewhere in between. I just want to know so that I can 
help your teachers teach you better, so make sure you tell me what you really think.  
 
For each item, say: Imagine that you could only solve [read problem and point to card with 
problem written on it] by breaking it up into smaller problems. Do you think you would have to 
work hard or not work hard to solve the problem by breaking it up? 
 
If child picks large blue circle 
You said you think you would have to work hard to solve the problem by breaking it up. Do you 
think you would you have to work very hard [point to largest blue circle], pretty hard [point to 




If child picks small green circle 
You said you think you would not have to work hard to solve the problem by breaking it up. Do 
you think you would you have to work a little hard [point to largest green circle], a tiny bit hard 





Appendix D: No-Choice Arithmetic Task Script 
“The next thing I want you to do is to actually solve some problems using the breaking it up 
strategy and tell me what answer you get. Remember the breaking it up strategy is when you 
break a problem into simpler problems. Like when I used breaking it up to add 9+8, first I made 
it easier by breaking it up into 9+1=10. making 10. I took a 1 from the 8 and added it to the 9 to 
make 10, and then I added the 7 left over to get 17. 
 
Now, you let’s try it together. Let’s solve 18 + 3 using breaking it up. First, let’s get 20. I know 
that 18+ 2 is 20. Ok, so we take 2 from the 3 to get 18+2=20. Now we have to add what is left 
over. What do we do now? Yes! 20+ 1. That’s a simple problem! 20 +1 is….. Right! 21! 
 
Now I want you to try. How could you solve 17+6 by breaking it up?  
 
If they break up 6 into 3 and 3 say, “Great job! You broke 6 up into 3 and 3 to make this big 
problem a little easier for you. You added 17+3 and then you added 3 more” 
 
If they separate 7+6 and 10 say, “Great job! You broke 17 up into 10 and 7 to make this big 
problem a little easier for you. You added 7+6 and then you added 10 more” 
 
If they do not use breaking up say “Nice job trying! Remember, when you use breaking it up you 
break a problem up into simpler problems. One way you could use breaking it up to solve 17+6 
is to break 6 up into 3 and 3. You could add the first 3 to 17 to get 20 and then add the second 3 
to get 23!” 
 
Remember, you have to use the breaking it up strategy and ONLY the breaking it up strategy to 
solve all the problems I show you, even if you know another way to get the answer. There are a 
lot of different ways to use breaking it up. As long as you break up the problem into simpler 
problems, you are using breaking it up. Ok?  
 
Great! As you solve each problem, I want you to talk out loud, so I can see how you used 
breaking it up. This way I can learn about what kids to when using breaking it up and help your 
teachers.  
 
Begin recording and say into the recorder, “This is participant ____, no choice task.”  
 
Let’s start! [show and read problem to child] Solve this problem by breaking it up. Talk out loud 
while you solve it, so I can see how you used breaking it up.   
 
If child does not speak out loud say, “Tell me how you solved the problem?” 
 
If child uses a different strategy (not decomposition), say “Remember, you always need to use 





Appendix E: Correlations Between SES Variables and Outcomes of Interest 
 
  Parent Education Family Income 
Family Income .50*** - 
No Choice Accuracy Single .27** .23* 
No Choice Accuracy Mixed .26** .32** 
Choice Decomp Single .21* .18 
Choice Decomp Mixed .21* .24* 
Choice Accuracy Single .11 .02 
Choice Accuracy Mixed .21* .37** 
Competence Single 0.06 .18 
Competence Mixed 0.11 .33* 
Effort Single -.12 -.09 
Effort Mixed -.19* 0.14 
Fluency .03 -.02 
Verbal Short-Term Memory .26** .28** 
Verbal working Memory .04 .004 
Visuospatial Short-Term Memory .05 .21* 
Visuospatial Working Memory .22* .35* 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
 
 
